GNU’s coalition politics mutating into a dangerous scramble for executive power

In the late nineteenth century, European powers gathered at the Berlin Conference to carve up the African continent as if it were terra nullius, slicing territories into artificial regions to govern, exploit and ultimately enrich themselves.

That notorious “Scramble for Africa” left deep and lasting scars. It fragmented societies and installed political arrangements that served the ambitions of elites rather than the needs of the people who lived on the land.

Today, South Africa faces a troubling echo of that logic, not across its geography but within the heart of its executive. Political parties, emboldened by the dynamics of the Government of National Unity (GNU), are carving up Cabinet portfolios as if they were concessions to be allocated, occupied, and defended.

Each party claims “its” ministries. Each insists on deciding who may sit in “its” seat. And each behaves as though the national Cabinet exists to advance party interests rather than to serve the people of the Republic.

The recent episode in which DA Leader John Steenhuisen notified President Cyril Ramaphosa to remove Dr Dion George as Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment and replace him with loyalist Willie Aucamp is a deeply problematic development.

It demonstrates how quickly coalition politics can mutate into a modern scramble for executive power, where parties behave like colonial administrators carving out territories rather than constitutional actors bound by the supremacy of the law.

Read more: Axed Environment Minister Dion George suing for millions for defamation

No ambiguity

The South African Constitution leaves absolutely no ambiguity about who appoints and dismisses ministers. Section 91(2) states “The President appoints the Deputy President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, and may dismiss them.”

This power is exclusive. It is vested in the president alone and is not subject to party approval. It is not subordinate to coalition agreements. It is not shared with party leaders, nor can it be outsourced to political negotiations.

The notion that a party leader may simply notify or instruct the president to dismiss one minister and appoint another is not merely inappropriate, it is borderline unconstitutional. It attempts to invert the hierarchy of executive authority, placing parties above the president and, by extension, above the Constitution itself.

Yet the more alarming issue is not only who appoints ministers but how the Cabinet is meant to function once they are appointed. Section 92(2) of the Constitution makes this plain as it states, “Members of the Cabinet are collectively responsible for the actions of the Cabinet.”

Collective responsibility is the engine of executive governance. A Cabinet cannot have multiple ideological centres of gravity. It cannot be subdivided into competing party units, each accountable to its own internal leadership. It cannot have ministers who declare that they represent “the DA position”, “the IFP position”, or “the ANC position” on matters that the Constitution requires to be handled collectively.

In short, you cannot federate a Cabinet. If ministers answer first to their party bosses rather than to the president, collective responsibility collapses. Decision-making becomes fragmented and policy coherence is impossible. The executive begins to behave not as one government but as a patchwork of simultaneous governments, each pulling in different directions, which is precisely the kind of chaos the Constitution was crafted to avoid.

Practical consequence

In addition, there is a more practical consequence that affects ordinary South Africans who rely on government services. If the Minister of Home Affairs is treated as a representative of Party X, and citizens do not receive services, to whom do they direct their frustration? They cannot march to the party headquarters or haul a party caucus before Parliament. They cannot hold a party leader accountable for departmental failures.

The Constitution is explicit that ministers are accountable to Parliament, and through Parliament to the public. By treating ministries as party territories, parties sever that chain of accountability. They turn public offices into partisan fiefdoms, leaving citizens trapped in a no man’s land where service delivery collapses but no one can be held responsible.

A final, devastating consequence of this party-federalised Cabinet model is that the president becomes unable to exercise the most basic function of leadership: selecting a team capable of governing.

If every attempt to appoint or dismiss a minister has become a party crisis and every personnel decision has threatened to unravel the GNU, then the president has been effectively shackled. He must live with the ministers he is given, be they competent or incompetent.

He cannot shape an executive aligned to the national interest. South Africa is left with a president who carries constitutional responsibility but without constitutional control, which is an untenable situation in any democracy.

Some may argue that coalition politics necessitates compromise. While this is of course true, compromise cannot extend to rewriting the Constitution by stealth. Coalition agreements may determine how parties cooperate, but they cannot displace the constitutional structure of executive power.

Supreme law

The Constitution is the supreme law, and everyone is subject to it. Parties may propose candidates, but they cannot appoint them. They may disagree internally, but they cannot instruct the president. Anything else risks recreating within the Cabinet room the very chaos of overlapping, competing authorities seen during Africa’s colonial carving.

The GNU must urgently recognise this reality. The country cannot afford a divided Cabinet. It cannot afford ministerial instability caused by internal party disputes. It cannot afford an executive that behaves like an auction floor for political influence.

South Africa requires a constitutionally appointed Cabinet that acts with collective responsibility, led by a president empowered to direct and shape the executive. Our democracy depends on a clear line of accountability from citizens to Parliament, to ministers, and ultimately to the president. What the country needs is a unified government instead of a collection of competing party interests.

A patchwork Cabinet carved up like colonial concessions will lead to paralysis, confusion, and the steady erosion of democratic governance. If the Scramble for Africa taught us anything, it is that carving up authority for the benefit of elites always leaves the people worse off.

The scramble for Cabinet must stop, before the damage becomes irreparable. DM