President Cyril Ramaphosa (centre) talks to reporters after casting his vote at the Hitekani Primary School in Soweto on 29 May 2024. South Africa appears to be in uncharted territory after the ANC’s apparent failure to hold on to its majority after the 2024 elections, with questions being asked about Ramaphosa’s future – will he remain as President or will he go, and what the ANC will do in either event. (Photo: Stringer / EPA-EFE)
Observers of our politics will get weary of the phrase “uncharted territory” over the next few weeks, as the shock induced by these election results settles in.
By any measure, the ANC’s roughly 15 percentage point decline to just north of 40%, while not that surprising, is still shocking and is bound to induce further tectonic tremors in our political scene.
In some democracies, such as the UK, a political leader who loses a significant share of the vote in an election is expected to resign, the idea being that they should, for the sake of the party, allow new blood to take over.
While some in the ANC may well demand that of Ramaphosa, the situation is complicated by the fact that there does not appear to be anyone in the party who could have done better. His allies are likely to argue that in fact without him, the result could even have been worse.
For the moment, there appear to be two major routes open to the party: to retain him as leader, or to remove him (or for him to resign).
This might well cause a battle between the forces of rationality, and the forces of the angry emotion that is in the process of being uncorked as the bad results gush towards the IEC’s results table.
It would be rational to assume that the most important priority in the ANC right now is to retain as much power as possible for the next five years, and set a stage for a possible full return to power in 2029.
In pursuit of these ideals, no chaos can be tolerated, and the chaos that would ensue should Ramaphosa leave his position soon cannot be underestimated.
Firstly, there is simply no mechanism to easily replace him. While Paul Mashatile is the deputy president of the ANC, the real top leadership mandate needs to come with the full vote at the electoral conference. Otherwise, while they might be in office, they may battle to have power.
It seems impossible to imagine that such a process, involving a leadership election, could be held in the near future.
Also, the clock is ticking, two weeks after the election is proclaimed by the Electoral Commission, Parliament must meet, swear in MPs and then elect a President.
If there were a move to replace Ramaphosa now, it would probably lead to huge division in the party’s top leadership – with the National Executive Committee (NEC) almost certainly split on the matter.
This would then bring a nightmare scenario of no agreement on who the new President of South Africa should be – and all of it while deciding on the fundamentally important direction to take on which coalitions to choose.
Even if somehow a candidate such as Mashatile were put forward as the presidential candidate for the ANC in Parliament, these divisions could even result in some ANC MPs refusing to vote for him. This would open the door, however unlikely, to other parties electing people or deciding which ANC candidate to back. Without cohesive leadership in the party, it would then be difficult for the NEC to act against those MPs.
The roots of this chaos manor were sown a long time ago.
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, still officially a Cabinet Minister, voted against the party Whip on the Phala Phala vote and was never disciplined. If the NEC could not act against her two years ago, it would be nigh impossible to act against runaway MPs now.
This is a big risk for the ANC – while it may be tempting to blame Ramaphosa for this result, removing him will invite even more chaotic outcomes.
The result of that would be that in five years’ time, the ANC would probably become just another “biggish party” and drop much further down in voters’ estimation.
Should the DA retain the support it has now, it could become the biggest party in Parliament.
Of course, it is possible that Ramaphosa walks the plank of his own accord and makes himself unavailable for reelection.
This would probably have the same chaotic outcome. Some in the top leadership of the ANC might even ask him to stay on, temporarily. In other words, they would ask him to stand for election, be elected, appoint a Cabinet and then resign a few months later.
This scenario could avoid the chaos and allow the party some space in which to elect or appoint a new long-term leader to take over.
If only things were so simple, though – there are other problems even if Ramaphosa stays on.
One of the major points of power of ANC leaders up until this point has been their power in government, their ability to appoint Cabinet Ministers and other positions, and the rarely questioned prestige of the Office of the President.
Jacob Zuma used this to great effect, particularly for the benefit of the Guptas.
It now appears the ANC will be unable to enforce the policies the way it used to and will need support for even the simplest of laws or budgets it wants to pass.
This means that Ramaphosa himself would have less power. The time of a powerful Presidency, of a person whom others in politics fear could be in our past.
Considering that even when the ANC appeared almost all-powerful (just three days ago now), Ramaphosa was unable to implement much of the reform agenda – the uncertainty and loss of power may render these a fantasy. One would have to question whether his reform agenda can still survive in any shape.
For the moment, with so many processes already under way, it would appear some of the momentum which has built up involving the relationship between business and government would not easily be stopped.
Certainly, the dynamics which have led to a bigger role for the private sector in our economy than ever before have not gone away.
This should mean, at least in the short term, that the increased role for the private sector in electricity and Transnet’s railways and ports should continue.
Tenders have been issued, solar installations built and agreements signed.
But the energy with which they have been pursued, however slowly, may now dissipate. This could well be a symbol for much of governance, no matter who leads the next administration.
Of course, while this election result is a huge shock to the ANC, it is not the end of the story. The next step is the decision about coalitions. And it is entirely possible that the ANC’s decision about coalition partners is what really determines Ramaphosa’s fate.
It is worth reiterating that the question of who the ANC chooses as coalition partners is completely intertwined with the issue of who will be the President.
Before the election it seemed obvious that if the party decided to work with the EFF, Ramaphosa would be in danger, and if it worked with the DA (in a grand national coalition) he might be in a stronger position.
Now, with the EFF’s share of the vote declining rather than strengthening, its negotiating position might well be weaker. Assuming that the ANC cannot form a coalition with the MK party while keeping Ramaphosa as president, this may strengthen the chances of a grand national coalition.
And while the ANC would surely demand the right to select the President, the DA would surely insist that it be no one other than Ramaphosa.
This means that in the end, the biggest factor in whether he stays or goes will actually be decided by who the ANC decides to work with.
While the phrase uncharted territory may be boring, when there, it is still best to strap in. DM