The findings of Acting Public Protector Kholeka Gcaleka that President Cyril Ramaphosa has no case to answer for his role in the Phala Phala scandal does not appear to leave him blame-free. The entire sordid affair, apart from being far from over, leaves a bitter taste and still has the potential to further weaken, and even define, his Presidency. (That last point is particularly poignant in the absence of any great achievements for him to point to.) 

Phala Phala is also likely to lead to much more difficult politics, still producing acres of muddy space where political players will keep trading accusations and insults, even as they are unable to prove they are clean themselves.

There can be no doubt as to the political power of the Phala Phala scandal, which for a period of several days in December threatened to end Ramaphosa’s presidency. After all, this is a scandal about a business owned by our head of state who claimed he received foreign cash from a foreign business person and had a worker stash it in a couch – and that was considered the least bad option at that moment.

Read more in Daily Maverick: Damage: With Ramaphosa in fight for his political life, the ANC has only bad, worse and terrible options

While Ramaphosa has been cleared by the acting Public Protector in this specific report, and with a specific brief to start with, it is still entirely legitimate to ask what the impact on our politics would be if the foreign businessperson with whom the President’s farm had concluded this deal had the surname Gupta, or by any chance hailed from Russia.

That said, clearing the obstacle of the Public Protector investigation is an important procedural moment for Ramaphosa, meaning there is one fewer investigation to get through, but there is still no clear word from the Hawks or from the SA Reserve Bank about what findings they may come to. Or, in the case of the SA Reserve Bank, what they may have already come to (those findings may remain forever confidential).

While Gcaleka found no wrongdoing on the part of Ramaphosa in her report, there are still questions.

For example, on page 242, she says:

“While the facts point towards the President being more involved in the management of the affairs of the CC than he appears to let on in his general submissions, the Public Protector could not find evidence indicating that the President is actively involved in the day-to-day operations of Ntaba Nyoni or Phala Phala farm.”

Essentially, she appears to be saying, in her Executive Summary no less, that she does not quite believe the word of the President.

This is important. It suggests that she believes he has not been entirely honest on this issue. And if he was not honest about how the farm is run, it does suggest that he may not have been entirely honest in his other submissions on this scandal.

A page earlier in her finding, she says that:

“The Public Protector finds that to have a financial interest in a business is distinguishable from working, being employed, and receiving remuneration for contributing to the operations of the business. What is prohibited is the active involvement of members in the enterprises which produce the income – because that would divide their attention from their official duties.”

Does this mean that Ramaphosa, or a future President, would be able to own a business, receive income from that business and allow that enterprise to do business with anyone?

So, for example, could Ramaphosa or someone else own a firm that does business with another entity that is harming the state, or in direct conflict with our national interest? Could it be in business with another potentially hostile government or a mighty corporation such as Russian nuclear giant Rosatom?

It is also worth asking how our society would react if the Phala Phala deal had not been with the Sudanese businessperson Hazim Mustafa, but with one Edwin Sodi?

Gcaleka has found both that “while the facts point towards the President being more involved in the management of the affairs of the CC than he appears to let on”, he can still do this because “what is prohibited is the active involvement of members in the enterprises which produce the income”. 

It seems hard to believe that he was “more involved” in one paragraph, and yet not breaking the prohibition of “active involvement” in the other.

This interpretation may well be challenged in a court.

Then there are the findings that the head of Ramaphosa’s security detail, Wally Rhoode, is guilty of wrongdoing because while Ramaphosa (correctly in her view) reported the crime to him, Rhoode did not report it to his commanding officer.

Importantly she says, on page 182:

“There is no evidence upon which to conclude that Gen Rhoode was influenced, coerced or dictated to by the President as to how he should deal with this matter.”

The question then becomes: If the President is employing someone who cannot be trusted, what does that tell us about Ramaphosa himself?

This entire scandal raises so many further issues, and it may be hard for many voters to get away from the memory of the Nkandla years.

In both cases, the ANC used its parliamentary majority to overturn or ignore the findings of an independent report. 

In both cases, there are important questions to ask about the actions of the institutions involved in investigating what happened. Opposition parties are now claiming that Gcaleka is protecting Ramaphosa. In the case of Zuma, the ANC attacked then Public Protector Thuli Madonsela over both Nkandla and State Capture.

But the real consequence may simply be its important contribution to understanding that our politics are but one continuous scandal.

While those in opposition parties are likely to focus on this for some time to come (and a legal challenge to the report will keep the issue in the public domain for perhaps two more years), it could also have implications within the ANC.

Currently, Deputy President Paul Mashatile is facing questions about his financial relationships with Sodi and others. His supporters could well say there is no difference between his relationships and those of Ramaphosa.

Read more in Daily Maverick: Paul Mashatile’s presidential ambitions lose lustre in harsh glare of news spotlight

This means that, no matter what happens in the ANC, there appears to be virtually zero chance of it being able to campaign under a scandal-free leader in next year’s polls and possibly for years to come.

Considering how important the issue of corruption is likely to be in those elections, this could pose a major problem for the party.

But for Ramaphosa, the major problem of Phala Phala is that it could symbolise his Presidency. As many have recently noted, he has appeared uninterested in governance since the scandal broke in 2022.

There is no indication of his active involvement in leading in our domestic politics (a noticeable exception is a recent speech he gave in Paris about the West’s hoarding of Covid-19 vaccine doses).

And he appears to have very few, if any, achievements to point to. Certainly, there is no social pact, no improvement in our economy, no reduction in youth unemployment. Instead, on his watch, life has got much worse, harder and more violent for almost all South Africans.

This means, in the absence of his foreseeable awakening and graduation into active leadership, his Presidency runs the risk of being remembered chiefly for the cash stashed in a sofa. What an awful way to be remembered. DM