In a geopolitical environment increasingly influenced by technological power, South Africa has taken a significant and potentially self-sabotaging misstep.
Taiwan’s recent decision to curb chip exports to South Africa, announced on 23 September 2025, was not a random act of economic aggression; it was a direct tit-for-tat retaliation to Pretoria’s repeated diplomatic actions to unilaterally downgrade and rename Taiwan’s representative offices.
By bowing to Beijing, South Africa has provoked a polity that is the leader in a technology critical to modern life. This move, seemingly made in an attempt to align more closely with China, could hinder and delay South Africa’s industrial and digital development for years.
On 21 July 2025, following a delegation led by Deputy President Paul Mashatile to China from 14 to 18 July, Pretoria issued an official notice formalising the renaming of Taiwan’s representative offices in Pretoria and Cape Town (officially known as the Taiwan Liaison Office) to the Taipei Commercial Office.
To add insult to injury, the notice issued in the Government Gazette was backdated to take effect from 1 April, reportedly without consultation with Taiwan officials. The South African government, citing its alignment with Beijing’s “One-China” policy, also reiterated demands for Taiwan to move its office from the capital, Pretoria, to Johannesburg.
G20 optics
Following the South African delegation’s visit to China, the timing of the announcement suggests that Chinese officials may have influenced this move. And, with the G20 summit around the corner, South African officials would very much prefer Taiwan to relocate its representative office (with as little fuss as possible) out of the capital before Chinese leader Xi Jinping visits the country for the G20 Summit in November.
For Taiwan, this was more than a procedural change; it was an affront to its sovereignty and dignity, and a clear violation by South Africa of its 1997 pact with the Taiwan government.
The agreement allowed Taiwan to establish representative offices and maintain its administrative office in Pretoria, the capital, and ensured that the liaison offices would function as de facto embassies – allowing for the handling of visa and consular affairs – but without formal diplomatic recognition, thereby adhering to South Africa’s recognition of Beijing’s “One-China” policy.
In response to South Africa’s diplomatic downgrade, Taiwan responded by leveraging its dominance in the global semiconductor market, making it clear that it will not tolerate diplomatic snubs. The Ministry of Economic Affairs announced on 23 September that it implemented new export controls requiring prior approval for 47 specific products, including integrated circuits (ICs), chips and memory technology, when shipped to South Africa.
In response, on 24 September, China’s Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson, Guo Jiakun, condemned Taiwan’s actions, stating that Taiwan was weaponising its chip trade, which could destabilise the global chip industry and supply chains. He further highlighted the rapid development of China’s chip industry and noted that its chip exports to South Africa in 2024 were three times that exported by Taiwan.
Additionally, Guo Jiakun indicated China’s approval of South Africa’s diplomatic actions toward Taiwan and its readiness to support the country by filling the chip export gap that Taiwan would create through its implementation of chip export controls.
The very next day, on 25 September, officials in Taipei appeared to reconsider the implementation of the export controls. Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs announced it would suspend export restrictions after South Africa requested negotiations on the matter.
South Africa’s leverage
This change of course could have been influenced by South Africa hinting at its own leverage. On the same day of Taiwan’s announcement on the chip export controls, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s spokesperson, Chrispin Phiri, emphasised that South Africa’s ties with Taiwan were non-political and made it known that the country was a key supplier of platinum group metals, such as palladium, which are crucial for the global semiconductor industry.
Phiri’s words strongly suggested that if Taiwan were to follow through on weaponising its chip exports, South Africa would probably retaliate by restricting the export of these vital commodities. Such a move would mark a significant escalation, potentially disrupting global semiconductor supply chains.
Commercial considerations, particularly considering growing competition from Chinese chip-making companies, may have also influenced Taipei’s reconsideration of its decision.
By curbing exports of, arguably, its most critical economic leverage point, Taiwan will leave a gap in demand that can subsequently be filled by dominant Chinese chip-making companies, ready to capitalise on any new market opportunities. If South Africa were to seek alternatives, China’s producers would be ready.
Consequences
If talks with Taiwan fail and Taipei decides to stick to its guns, the consequences for South Africa will be far-reaching. Although Taiwan is not a major chip supplier to South Africa, it is the world’s leading producer of the most advanced semiconductors.
These chips are essential for everything from cars to data centres, serving as the foundational technology for key sectors across South Africa’s economy.
The country’s automotive industry, a cornerstone of its manufacturing sector, heavily depends on semiconductors for modern vehicles. Any disruption in chip supply could halt production, risking thousands of jobs and billions of rands in annual exports.
Additionally, the development of advanced technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and 5G infrastructure depends heavily on access to state-of-the-art chips. Without them, South Africa’s ability to innovate and compete in the global digital economy would be greatly limited, slowing the country’s progress and raising costs for tech and manufacturing sectors.
US-China rivalry
South Africa’s diplomatic downgrading of Taiwan has placed Pretoria in the middle of the techno-geopolitical rivalry between the US and China.
The proposed Taiwanese chip curb, while a direct response to a diplomatic insult, should also be viewed through the lens of the US-led CHIP4 alliance, which includes Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This group was formed to restrict China’s access to advanced chips, ostensibly to thwart its rise as a tech superpower.
Taiwan’s weaponisation of its chip trade demonstrates strategic alignment with the CHIP4 principles, sending a warning that diplomatic gestures favouring Beijing and undermining Taipei’s sovereignty could lead to economic consequences within the hi-tech supply chain.
Although there is no direct evidence that the alliance coordinated the move, it clearly advances the group’s primary objective as it increases the political and economic costs for any country considering a similar diplomatic downgrade, effectively utilising the “silicon shield” globally.
The SA-Taiwan diplomatic row naturally directs South Africa toward China as its primary alternative source for chip imports. China is already South Africa’s biggest sovereign trading partner, and as fellow BRICS compatriots, both nations share a political vision of challenging Western global dominance.
Recent agreements, notably China’s pledge to invest $10-billion in South Africa to build BRICS’ largest “Silicon Valley” in Africa, along with existing Chinese ICT investments, establish an already growing ecosystem for Chinese-sourced components.
Major risks
While China is a producer of semiconductors, its capabilities – especially in the most advanced chip technology required for cutting-edge AI and 5G infrastructure – still lag behind those of Taiwan.
Relying solely on China presents two major risks: it makes South Africa’s economy vulnerable to a single, politically motivated supplier, and it could significantly limit the country’s access to the most advanced technologies, potentially hindering its innovation and global competitiveness.
Other potential options are similarly complicated: South Korea, a major global semiconductor player, is constrained by its membership in the CHIPS4 alliance, whereas other BRICS members, like India, have only nascent semiconductor manufacturing industries of their own.
In this era of hyper-techno-geopolitics, South Africa’s diplomatic jab at Taiwan is a high-stakes gamble that exchanges geopolitical alignment for technological vulnerability and limited access to the world’s most cutting-edge chips.
With this in mind, South Africa’s digital future will now be defined by its ability to navigate the highly politicised landscape of global semiconductor competition between China and the US and its allies, which includes Taiwan – the linchpin in the international semiconductor value and supply chains. DM