Middle East hope springs eternal — or more of the same old, same old?

“The toughest negotiations are with your own side” – Gerry Adams. Sinn Fein leader.

“Much could go wrong in coming days, and in the Middle East it often does. The ‘peace’ deal Mr. Trump heralded on Truth Social on Wednesday evening may look more like another temporary pause in a war that started with Israel’s founding in 1948, and has never ended.” – David Sanger, New York Times correspondent.

A deal beckons

Almost miraculously, there is the astonishing reality that Israeli and Hamas negotiators in Cairo (with the additional presence of US facilitators) have achieved their handshake. 

For now, at least, the residents of Gaza will not be staring fearfully up at the sky for the next new aerial onslaught or wondering where their next meal is coming from. And for their part, Israelis are preparing to welcome home the remaining hostages who have been held in the tunnels of Gaza for more than two years.

This latest conflict began with an attack by Hamas on the crowd gathered at a music festival in Israel, near the Gaza boundary, and went further into nearby villages, resulting in more than 1,200 people killed and some 250 people seized as hostages.

In response, the Israelis launched an intensive air and ground assault on Gaza that has led to the deaths of more than 60,000 people (according to the Palestinian Health Ministry), with noncombatant casualties significantly outnumbering those of Hamas fighters. 

In what many observers have called the most intractable of all international conflicts, regiments of diplomats, analysts, advisers and political figures have gone bone-weary and grey-haired in their attempts to cope with the complications of delivering any kind of Middle East peace process – piecemeal or comprehensively. There has been occasional progress, but more usually, there have been collapsed hopes.

Competing histories

(Those bored with history can skip ahead to two chapters later).

Depending on who is speaking, the trouble has its origins when the Romans crushed two Judean revolts and the subsequent exiling of much of the Jewish population to the rest of the Roman world. 

Or, perhaps it begins with the Byzantine Empire’s exclusions of Jews from Jerusalem, before the territory’s conquest by Arab Islamic armies in the eighth century. In turn, in the centuries that followed, those conquerors were replaced by Mameluke and Ottoman armies. 

For others, their ledger starts with the division of Ottoman lands under the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain, and then the Balfour Declaration endorsing a Jewish homeland, both coming in the middle of World War 1. The territory, including what later became Transjordan, became a British League of Nations-mandated territory.

Meanwhile, by the beginning of the 20th century, immigrant Jews fleeing pogroms in Eastern Europe began arriving in the territory. After World War 2, Jewish survivors of the Holocaust made their way there as well (often hindered by British forces in the mandated territory).

Following Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948, Middle Eastern, North African and East African Jews made their way there – often pushed out of their ancient homelands, or fleeing ahead of imminent persecutions (a majority of Israelis now trace their origins to those migrations.) 

This, however, has a tragic parallel in the flight of many Arab residents from the Israeli portion of the soon-to-be-partitioned territory and on into refugee camps in Gaza, Jordan and Lebanon. Stateless, those people became wards of the UN, with much of their sustenance obtained from an agency of the UN.

Collectively, this forms both the prelude to and the aftermath of the UN-sanctioned partition plan of 1947, the establishment of the modern state of Israel (and consequent control of Gaza by Egypt and the West Bank and East Jerusalem by Jordan after the failed attack by five Arab armies on Israel). 

But then there have been the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973; Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon a decade later; the Intifada rising by many Arab residents in the West Bank territories occupied by Israel after the Six Day War of 1967; and policies by successive Israeli governments to sponsor (or turn a blind eye towards) both sanctioned and extra-legal Israeli settlements growing in the West Bank. 

The long history of invasions, dispossessions and exile may be too much to be borne easily by this small slice of geography (you can read some of our prior articles here, here and here).

Peacekeeping and peacemaking – breakthroughs and failures

The ceasefires and agreements have almost inevitably been followed by yet newer conflicts. The ceasefire line ending the 1948 fighting was meant as a temporary delineation, pending a peace accord that never occurred. 

The ceasefire with Egypt after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 (in tandem with the pullout by France and Britain after their seizure of the Suez Canal in response to Egypt’s nationalisation of it) largely held for 11 years, but then came the 1967 war.

In that conflict, Israel again conquered the Sinai and Gaza, as well as the West Bank territory between Jordan and Israel and the Golan Heights at the Syria-Israel border, setting up the circumstances for later difficulties.

The negotiated settlement between Israel and Egypt following the 1973 war again led to an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the eventual establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two nations. But that breakthrough required arduous negotiations guided by US President Jimmy Carter in a mountain retreat.

Sadly, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in response to this bold move. And some years later, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was also murdered – by an Israeli citizen – for daring to advocate moves towards a more comprehensive settlement as well. For leaders, there are personal risks in aiming towards peace settlements in the Middle East. 

Meanwhile, any solid, permanent arrangements between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA) based in Ramallah on the West Bank continue to founder. 

Real progress is difficult to achieve because Israel largely controls the purse strings for the PA’s activities, and Israel’s disagreements about the extent of authority the PA can exercise over a now-fragmented West Bank – one with Israeli-controlled security zones woven all through it. 

Meanwhile, following the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas gained control in the territory’s only election the next year. (Hamas sometimes used deadly force to eliminate opponents who were PA adherents.)

Blowback from Israel’s response to the 7 October attack

In response to Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack over the past two years of fighting, the destruction of much of Gaza’s infrastructure, the massive death toll and forced migrations of people desperate for scarce food, shelter, or for a simple avoidance of death, has generated growing international approbation towards the Israeli state and its leaders (including South Africa’s pursuit of charges of genocide at the International Court of Justice). 

As a corollary, the fighting has also generated angry reactions against non-Israeli Jews, including big protests on many US university campuses, in addition to massive protests in cities around the world.

Failures of strategic leadership

A major complicating element has been the quality of leadership (or the lack of it) in the warring parties. The leadership cadre in Hamas (and in Hezbollah’s, operating out of southern Lebanon) has proven to be obdurate but resilient in continuing to lead resistance against the Israeli military, but largely without regard for the dire consequences that have rained down upon a terrorised non-combatant population in Gaza.

Still, in the face of that Israeli military onslaught, Hamas managed to maintain a leadership cadre and fighting capabilities among those still in Gaza (plus those who had sanctuary in Doha on the Persian Gulf, but minus those killed by Israeli forces).

Hezbollah’s downward trajectory was astonishing when much of its leadership was killed in an Israeli operation that used hundreds of exploding pagers and other communications devices, eliminating much of Hezbollah’s leadership cadre.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government, in its domestic political circumstances, remains captive to Benjamin Netanyahu’s need to maintain his position in the face of potential criminal trials and convictions, and his instinct to show maximum strength in a national crisis to hold on to support. 

Moreover, his government remains dependent on the backing of ethno-religious right-wing parties in parliament, led by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. 

Consequently, any compromise has been elusive and represents a politically fraught choice – regardless of the larger costs internationally from such a stance. Ben Gvir and Smotrich have opposed compromise with Hamas or Palestinians and have continued to advocate military efforts in Gaza, as well as proposing the formal annexation of the West Bank. 

Taken together, the ideas and policies of the two sides would seem to be barren ground for a real compromise, despite the growing casualties and suffering among the people in Gaza, and the growing international anger directed at, and isolation of, Israel. 

What are the pressures towards a settlement?

Importantly, most Israelis have become reluctant to support the continuation of what has become a war of annihilation. (Some military reservists are even declining call-up orders for military service in a force dependent on trained reservists.) A majority of Israelis are increasingly focused on securing the release of the remaining hostages and ending the fighting, somehow.

The Donald Trump factor

Into this complex tangle has stepped Donald Trump, no longer insisting he could solve the Middle East’s problems in a heartbeat, or proposing to rebuild Gaza as a Mideastern version of Palm Beach or the French Riviera, but absent its current population.

His frequently ill-disciplined, intemperate and ignorant public statements, his over-enthusiastic embrace of Netanyahu and his musings about obliterating Hamas, and his joint effort with Israel to attack Iranian nuclear development sites would all seem to argue that Donald Trump is the least likely person to deliver a successful Middle East peace initiative.

And yet, Trump and his team entered this fray – like several presidents before him – as he decided to obtain some successful peacemaking in the Middle East. This week, in meetings in Cairo, both sides actually agreed on the initial parts of the Trump peace plan. 

As reported in Thursday’s New York Times, “Israel and Hamas have reached an agreement for the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, a long-awaited breakthrough that could point toward an end to the two-year war in Gaza. President Trump, who helped to broker the deal, said on social media Wednesday that both sides had agreed to the first phase of his plan, including that Israel would pull back its troops to an agreed-upon line. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said he had spoken with Mr Trump and would convene his government on Thursday to sign off on the agreement.”

The paper added, “for an interview done hours after a breakthrough agreement he [Trump] claimed would bring peace to the Middle East, President Trump spent little time actually discussing specifics. He did not say whether Hamas would disarm or if and when Palestinian prisoners would be released, nor did he go into detail about how Gaza would be governed – all of which have been sticking points of cease-fire talks...”

Despite the initial euphoria by some (such as the hostage families in Israel and obvious relief on the ground by the hard-pressed residents of Gaza), now banished has been the idea that peace is something to be reached quickly in some high-pressure negotiations.

Instead, it will be a time-consuming slog. There will be considerable wrangling over the specifics of all of the other remaining elements of that 20-point plan for resurrecting a devastated Gaza landscape and its institutions. 

Even if the opposing sides commit themselves to hammering out the actual details, there will be opportunities for someone to say, “Yes, but what about x?” Any such thing could throw the entire process back to square one – and the resumption of fighting.

Even though the Israeli government has now said it agrees with the proposal, and its cabinet was meeting on Thursday, 9 October, to ratify it formally, Hamas may yet decide the proposed plan leans far too much towards Israeli positions. They may choose to offer counterproposals over the plan, or reject it wholesale, given the lack of a formal role in the 20-point plan for Hamas in the post-fighting future.

How has the regional landscape changed?

But what has happened across the regional landscape, such that change became possible?

First, the Moscow-Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah-Hamas lineup has been deeply altered since the beginning of 2025, in addition to Moscow’s preoccupations with its invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the long-running al-Assad dynasty in Syria has been ousted, and thus the supply lines to Hezbollah and Hamas from Iran have been disrupted.

Moreover, the Syrians are attempting to reorient their state towards a more Western-friendly regime. There is even the possibility of building a relationship with Israel, despite Israel’s continued occupation of the Golan Heights.

Second, Hezbollah may now be a spent force, following the devastating pager/phone assault carried out against it by Israel, killing much of Hezbollah’s leadership in Syria and Lebanon, and with those remaining fighting over leadership succession. Further, Lebanon is making plans (and being promised foreign military support) to reclaim control over its southern territories, areas long controlled by Hezbollah and other Syria-aligned militias.

Third, leaders of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, as well as other Islamic nations in Asia (although not Iran), have made it increasingly clear they support a peace effort, built upon this new proposal.

Some of this may be attributable to Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner’s closeness to various Gulf state rulers, and thoughts that a peaceful outcome for Gaza, despite all the devastation and suffering, will be good for their respective nations’ security and prosperity (and Kushner’s, no doubt). 

Fourth, some part of this success may also be a function of Tony Blair’s visible role in the proposal as a kind of proconsul. Despite cries from some quarters that Blair’s involvement will simply recapitulate his disastrous role in the discredited Iraq War of 2003, he has nevertheless built ties with many Middle East leaders over decades, and his participation, too, may make the plan more palatable to Arab nations.

Fifth, for Israelis, while they clearly have been capable of crushing Hamas’ military capabilities (at a real cost to noncombatants), international support for the nation continues to ebb.

Particularly worrisome for Israelis must be the real slippage in support for Israel (versus Palestinians) among American voters – most especially among younger voters, and most particularly painful among younger Democrats and even among Jewish Americans, according to the whole spread of recent polling.

Despite the Trump administration’s diplomatic and military support, this erosion could well affect congressional backing for continued military sales and assistance – especially as members of Congress respond to their constituents’ feelings about Israel and Palestinians. 

Sixth, the Netanyahu government itself may be feeling the pressure domestically to reach towards a ceasefire and beyond, even if the right-wing parties continue to hold the keys to Netanyahu’s tenure in office. This is because Israel’s future includes a parliamentary election in 2026. 

A peace agreement might demonstrate to some voters that the Netanyahu government deserves another chance to run things. (Although there may also be an investigative commission over the failure of the Israel Defense Force and government to be alert to the possibility of that 7 October assault.)  

In conclusion

Many possibilities remain for missteps that could trigger a return to Israeli military action or resistance by Hamas, despite the international pressure and the suffering of the territory’s inhabitants. Moreover, the plan barely speaks of the West Bank, let alone the ever-receding idea of a stable two-state solution. Just the same, it is clear that the chances for peace are better than a month ago, let alone two years earlier. And that does matter. 

If peace really takes hold, just maybe the Nobel Prize committee could consider issuing a special gong with appropriate gold gilt-trimmed certificates for 2026 – and invite all of the combatants to a special ceremony, including Hamas’ Khaled Mashal and Muhammad Ismail Darwish – and even Donald Trump. DM