James Selfe's memoirs of the rise and fall of the DA's Mmusi Maimane

Former DA Federal Council chairperson James Selfe wrote a number of chapters and overviews of events and people, but the weariness caused by his illness meant that his written story was incomplete when he died in May 2024. His widow Sheila wanted Selfe’s contribution to South Africa’s body politic to be recognised. This extract, the final of four, is drawn from the drafts James left behind. Former DA MPs Wilmot James and Marian Shinn curated the extracts, and they were released with Sheila Selfe and the Selfe family’s support.

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Mmusi Maimane’s tenure as national leader of the Democratic Alliance was bookmarked by the party’s best local government election results in 2016, which won it a governing role in four metros and, in 2019, its first electoral decline in national elections.

Mmusi was the third black leader the DA hoped to show black voters that it shared their values and would govern to their advantage if it won elections. The previous hopefuls were former DA parliamentary leader Lindiwe Mazibuko and anti-apartheid struggle icon and political dilettante Dr Mamphela Ramphele.

It proved to be a rocky road that profoundly changed both our lives.

Lindiwe’s departure from the DA after the 2014 national election left a vacancy for the position of leader of the Parliamentary Caucus. DA leader Helen Zille kindly encouraged me to stand for the position. I thought deeply about it, but I preferred my role behind the scenes. I told Helen, with some regret, that I had decided against standing.

This left the caucus leadership open for Mmusi.

Our focus at this strategically crucial move was to “Make Mmusi shine”, but this proved to be a very difficult task. He didn’t always take my advice (which was his prerogative), but he seldom disagreed with me openly. He invariably failed to inform me (as chairperson of the Federal Council and member of the Federal Executive Management Committee) of his external advisers, who were invariably costly and often off budget.

On one occasion, I attended such a meeting entirely by mistake, at which the concept of promoting Mmusi’s “aura” – that mystical quality which real leaders were alleged to possess – was discussed.

Early in 2015, the DA’s three-yearly Federal Council met to, among other things, elect the national leader. There was a strong push to have Mmusi in the post, but Helen would have to be persuaded to step down. After strong pressure from her advisers, she resigned.

Former DA Federal Chairperson Wilmot James MP, (and many members of the commentariat) regarded Mmusi as a lightweight who lacked the skills to lead the party, so he unsuccessfully contested the leadership position. Mmusi convincingly won Congress’s support.

South Africa’s Fifth Parliament (2014-19) was dominated by the disruptive behaviour of the newly elected Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). They captured extensive media coverage.

Mmusi was concerned that the EFF was outflanking the DA as the official opposition. The search was on for a disruptive moment which would cause the black electorate to view the DA differently and set us apart from the EFF.

In April 2017, at a planning meeting for the 2019 election, an international political strategist, Stan Greenberg, said that the DA had huge potential, but the colonialism tweet by Helen, which gave qualified support to colonialism, had done serious damage to the DA. It changed the way Mmusi was viewed: many people believed that he was a puppet of, or a front, for whites, and that the moment the DA won power, the whites would remove him.

Stan said that Mmusi needed to be viewed as the next South African president. He needed to show that he felt the pain of those “left behind” by apartheid and to project both anger at the way things were and hope for the future.

Mmusi’s subsequent actions can be understood because he was fed this rich diet of flattery: that he was going to become the next president, and all he needed was to find a disruptive moment that would prompt dissatisfied blacks to vote for the party. Stan suggested that the one thing he could do was expel Helen.

Mmusi, meanwhile, having insisted on disciplinary action against Helen, now favoured mediation. This became a fierce fight that played out as much in public as it did in many internal meetings to mediate the conflict, and then the disciplinary hearings that followed Helen’s refusal to settle.

She frequently publicly stated her position and questioned the direction in which Mmusi was taking the party. She continued to comment publicly, so much so that the Federal Executive felt compelled to suspend her DA membership.

But continuing this was in no one’s interests. Her closest confidantes, MPs Geordin Hill-Lewis and Gavin Davis, brokered a settlement in June 2017. Among the settlement terms were the reinstatement of Helen’s DA membership and retention of her position as Premier of the Western Cape.

A further thorn in my relationship with Mmusi was when we tackled the issue of Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille’s much criticised leadership style, her handling of the drought’s “Day Zero” water crisis, and tender-rigging accusations against her, some senior officials, and politicians.

In short, attempts to get her to resign failed, as did a vote of no-confidence in her instigated by her caucus. Then followed a court battle to decide whether she had publicly stated she was not a DA member. For me, many of my colleagues and our lawyers, Patricia’s intention to resign was clear. Regrettably, the judges of the Western Cape Division disagreed. She won the case and kept her job.

Mmusi was livid. He increasingly held his own counsel, and I became more and more marginalised. He never said directly that he had lost confidence in me, but would get people to oppose proposals I made, oftentimes at his behest, only to change his mind at the last minute. Increasingly, he unilaterally incurred expenditure – often serious amounts.

Close to the 2019 election, the DA scored another own goal. A Schweizer-Reneke Grade 1 teacher stood accused of isolating a group of Tswana speakers from their Afrikaans-speaking classmates. Racism was the cry. There were many good reasons for the teacher’s decision, but they only came to the fore subsequently.

Our colleagues directing the election campaign latched on to this as a “disruptive moment”. Mmusi concurred. There was a series of unfortunate statements which implied that the DA was in favour of the MEC who suspended the teacher. The courts ruled against his decision.

When the full story emerged, we were left with egg on our faces. So this matter, with Mmusi’s suspension of Helen, the botched disciplinary case against Patricia de Lille, all combined to alienate significant numbers of voters.

The DA lost 475,000 votes in the 29 May 2019 election compared with the 2014 election. The ANC lost 1.5 million votes, but support for the FF+ and the EFF increased.

Immediately, we convened a Federal Executive meeting to interrogate our electoral performance. Mmusi accepted responsibility for the outcome, but not for what the party offered South Africa. He proposed a review of what the DA needed to do to become a party that could genuinely challenge for national power.

I believed that someone from the national leadership ought to resign. Mmusi had wanted me to resign for some time, and this seemed an appropriate time to effect that resignation.

Mmusi and I conferred, and it was agreed that I would step down as Chairperson of the Federal Council to take up the newly created position as Chairperson of Governance to assist municipalities in delivering on the DA mandate where we were in power. This was effected on 9 June.

The review he commissioned into our election results was reported on 18 and 19 October. In relation to leadership, the report got it absolutely correct. It reads –

“The relationship between the leader and the Chairperson of the Federal Council has become dysfunctional. The relationship has come to be characterised by a lack of trust and a failure to communicate effectively.

“It is recommended that those ultimately responsible for the leadership and management of the Party – the Leader, the Chairperson of the Federal Council and the Chief Executive – stand down and make way for new leadership.”

The report pointed out that both CEO Paul Boughey and I had already resigned, which left only Mmusi in his position as leader.

He resigned from the party on 23 October 2019. DM

Daily Maverick sent Mmusi Maimane and Helen Zille questions about claims in Selfe’s memoirs. Their responses appear below.

Helen Zille

I’m afraid James has twisted the facts and the timelines. There was a strategy document that I subsequently managed to get a copy of, which was compiled BEFORE my tweet on the LEGACY of colonialism. This document concluded that Mmusi would have to break out of the mould of being seen as a black leader of a “white” party. The strategy paper set out various action steps, including that all white DA shadow Ministers, including the then Chief Whip, John Steenhuisen, should have their “volume turned down” so that they were much less publicly visible/audible. Mmusi and various black leaders in the DA would then be able to fill the vacuum. Stan Greenberg’s advice was the foundation of this strategy document.

The strategy also sought a “catalytic moment” that would redefine Mmusi’s leadership of the DA.

This analysis brought “race essentialism” into the heart of the DA’s policy, as it was rooted in Critical Race Theory (wokeness) that was the dominant paradigm amongst American “liberals” at the time. Stan Greenberg was steeped in this paradigm, which directly contradicted the DA’s core values. James should have recognised this and objected. Instead, he surfed the wave.

My Tweet about the LEGACY OF COLONIALISM was perfectly timed for Stan Greenberg to advise Mmusi to go after me. This, he said, was the catalytic moment. If Mmusi could crush Zille and kick her out of the party, then he would lose the “puppet tag”.

This analysis has been repeatedly confirmed to me by people who were senior in the DA at the time, both politically and in the staff component.

Any other interpretation by James is pure selective rationalisation.

Mmusi and James went after me despite the fact that I had done or said absolutely NOTHING that violated the DA’s constitution or its rules. I had made a simple point that almost every historian and writer, including Nelson Mandela and Chinua Achebe, had made many times before – that it was important to preserve the aspects of colonialism’s legacy that could benefit present and future generations, not eradicate all its vestiges. Things like an independent judiciary, electricity generation, piped water, and the transport network. That is all so boringly obvious that it is incomprehensible that it caused such a meltdown. Except that it signified the wave of “cancel culture” that had arrived on South Africa’s shores. I was, of course, the perfect target, and the DA joined the witch-hunt, egged on by Stan Greenberg.

I have always rejected cancel culture as entirely undemocratic, because it seeks to banish from society anyone who holds a different opinion to the prevailing “woke” narrative, which I profoundly disagree with. So obviously, I was going to fight back. I was going to defend myself inside the DA and outside the DA, on the basis of the DA’s principles.

Mmusi and the DA proceeded to violate the DA’s constitution at every turn, including by not following the proper process to suspend my membership, and I knew that if the matter went to court, I would win. Gavin Davis and Geordin Hill-Lewis then came to plead with me not to take this matter through the courts. They said it would destroy Mmusi and damage the DA. They also conceded that I would win given the extent to which Mmusi (with James’ concurrence) had violated the DA’s constitution.

Eventually, I agreed to a negotiated agreement in order to avoid a court defeat for Mmusi and further embarrassment for the DA. The whole saga is set out in my book #StayWokeGoBroke.

Interestingly, and importantly, when I was subsequently elected as chair of the Federal Council to replace James, I unearthed the results of the DA’s extensive polling at the time, which showed that a full 57% of black respondents AGREED with the statement that “the legacy of colonialism was not only negative, but also positive”. Stan Greenberg and James Selfe were fully aware of the polls’ results, which underscores the cynicism with which they pursued my expulsion from the party, despite the evidence in my favour.

Mmusi Maimane

DM: Selfe claims that the strategic move behind getting you into the DA’s caucus leadership and to “Make Mmusi shine”, proved to be “a very difficult task”. He claims: “He [Mmusi] didn’t always take my advice (which was his prerogative), but he seldom disagreed with me openly. He invariably failed to inform me (as chairperson of the Federal Council and member of the Federal Executive Management Committee) of his external advisers, who were invariably costly, and often off budget.” Please could you comment?

MM: James was chairperson of the DA’s Federal Council for almost 30 years. I was the third DA leader he worked with in his position, which is akin to a Secretary General. The role of the leader is to set vision, take decisions and lead. The Federal Council chair implements. We had a good working relationship from the outset and I believe he served the party well. We worked closely in the aftermath of the 2016 local government elections in negotiating and forming new governments. Of course, we did not agree on everything, and I sought advice from a wide range of stakeholders. To build an inclusive organisation, that is required. When it came to institutional knowledge, James often relied on how things had always been done rather than looking for more effective ways to do them in the future.

DM: Selfe says you were concerned that the EFF was “outflanking the DA as the official opposition”. He writes: “The search was on for a disruptive moment which would cause the black electorate to view the DA differently, and set us apart from the EFF.” Please could you comment?

MM: There were almost 20 percentage points between the DA and the EFF, according to the DA’s internal polling. There was little risk of the EFF outflanking the DA. What we searched for were building moments to demonstrate an evolving party that was moving from protecting the interests of some, to advancing the interests of all. That naturally threatened people within the DA.

DM: There’s an implication from Selfe that your relationship with Helen Zille was strained, particularly around her colonialism tweet and subsequent disciplinary action. He claimed: “Mmusi’s subsequent actions can be understood because he was fed this rich diet of flattery: that he was going to become the next president, and all he needed was to find a disruptive moment that would prompt dissatisfied blacks to vote for the party. Stan suggested that the one thing he could do was expel Helen. Mmusi, meanwhile, having insisted on disciplinary action against Helen, now favoured mediation. This became a fierce fight that played out as much in public as it did in many internal meetings to mediate the conflict, and then the disciplinary hearings that followed Helen’s refusal to settle.” Please could you comment?

MM: In my mission to make the DA a home for all South Africans, the belief set that Helen Zille espoused in her rant of tweets on colonialism was inconsistent with the values of the organisation. I maintain the actions taken were proportional to the offence committed. Helen was removed from all DA structures. She equally resigned from the party, and the press conference had said there were moves to start another party. So in many ways, the animosity was designed to set up the new organisation and move DA donors to it.

The DA’s internal polling, which is highly accurate, showed that after the 2016 local government election, the DA was growing and the ANC shrinking. That trend would logically mean that if the DA overtook the ANC in a national election and won, the leader of the DA would become president. That has little to do with flattery.

DM: Selfe claims that a “further thorn” in his relationship with you was when you both dealt with the issue of former “Cape Town Mayor Patricia de Lille’s much criticised leadership style, her handling of the drought’s ‘Day Zero’ water crisis, and tender-rigging accusations against her, some senior officials, and politicians.” Selfe portrays you as “livid” when Patricia de Lille prevailed in court and implies you struggled to manage the fallout. “He [Mmusi] increasingly held his own counsel, and I became more and more marginalised. He never said directly that he had lost confidence in me, but would get people to oppose proposals I made, oftentimes at his behest, only to change his mind at the last minute. Increasingly, he unilaterally incurred expenditure – often serious amounts,” Selfe wrote. Please could you comment?

MM: James drove the legal action that involved both Patricia and Helen in separate instances. He was racking up losses in those, including incurring cost orders against the party.

In particular, the party’s federal executive resolved to ensure that Patricia resign as mayor of Cape Town, and James fell short in executing that mandate from the party. James became reclusive during these tough moments, which was unfortunate.

DM: According to Selfe, an incident involving a Schweizer-Reneke Grade 1 teacher who stood accused of isolating a group of Tswana speakers from their Afrikaans-speaking classmates in 2019, your suspension of Helen Zille, and the “ botched disciplinary case against Patricia de Lille all combined to alienate significant numbers of voters”. Please could you comment?

MM: Many factors led a number of white, Afrikaans South Africans to seek safe refuge in the Freedom Front Plus in the 2019 national and provincial elections.

DM: Selfe speaks about the loss of votes the DA experienced in 2019, compared with the 2014 elections. He claimed that you “accepted responsibility for the outcome, but not for what the party offered South Africa. He [Mmusi] proposed a review of what the DA needed to do to become a party that could genuinely challenge for national power. I believed that someone from the national leadership ought to resign. Mmusi had wanted me to resign for some time, and this seemed an appropriate time to effect that resignation.” Please could you comment?

MM: Again, James was approaching his 30th year in the same role, and I believe the facts show he was both running out of steam, and increasingly less interested in executing the mandate of the role. In wanting to continue the project, the DA needed new, younger blood, reach new constituencies, and as such, I pushed the notion of a new DA with diverse leadership and new targets. James had served his time. DM