On 29 December 2023, South Africa lodged what was to become a controversial application in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting proceedings against Israel, alleging breaches of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Leaving aside the motivations for and merits of the case, its perceived impact on South Africa has fuelled an already ongoing debate about the country’s foreign policy orientation, which is often discussed in terms of sweeping generalisations and based on questionable assumptions.
We argue that, in contrast to the simplistic analyses frequently framed in binary terms, South Africa’s foreign policy is a more nuanced endeavour.
One of the prevalent narratives is that South Africa’s foreign policy displays an anti-Western bias, is deliberately alienating South Africa’s major trading partners, and is supportive of totalitarian regimes, notably China, Russia and Iran.
According to this narrative, South Africa’s existing relationships, not only with the United States but also with other Western states, are put at risk, hurting the country’s material interests, particularly trade and foreign investment.
Punitive action
The imposition of tariffs on South African exports to the US by the Trump administration is considered a punitive action directly caused by this perceived foreign policy orientation.
Furthermore, that this action was a direct result of the ICJ case assumes that the Trump government acts in a rational manner which, given what we know of the current US president, cannot be taken at face value and certainly does not explain the imposition of seemingly random tariffs on a large number of states, including a 39% tariff on traditionally neutral Switzerland, and up to 50% tariffs on its ally India.
Despite some of the ideological rhetoric occasionally spouted by senior ANC officials, and while recognising that perceptions are not unimportant, South Africa’s foreign policy is not, in practice, primarily anti-Western.
Such a simplistic understanding obscures a more complex reality, involving interactions between different issue areas and role-players, and a careful balance between bilateral, multilateral and regional relationships. A comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy requires taking into account the broader ambit of our diplomatic practice.
While many European states, for example, may not be openly supportive of South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, these states, bearing in mind their own interests — which include economic ones — continue to engage with South Africa on questions of trade and other subjects of mutual interest.
This is not to claim that South Africa’s diplomatic architecture is beyond reproach. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) faces serious human and financial resource constraints, and it is also no secret that politicians, marinated in the confrontational and antagonistic rough-and-tumble of politics, make bad diplomats.
Read more: Dirco’s Zane Dangor speaks out on ICJ genocide case as Gaza teeters on edge of famine
The tendency of the ANC government to parachute recycled politicians into the system as ambassadors has consequently undermined the professionalism and impartiality of the diplomatic corps. The waters are also often muddied by the ineptitude and irresponsible statements of some politicians and government spokespeople, and a lack of cooperation between Dirco and other government departments.
Another core element of the current debate about South Africa’s foreign policy is that a choice must be made between pursuing a foreign policy driven by material interests, and a norms-based, values-oriented approach, with the former being the obvious choice.
Not only does this set up a false dichotomy between the multiple foreign policy goals and instruments that form part of all states’ international relations, but it also undermines the importance of the promotion and protection of human rights as a core of our international relations.
Nelson Mandela famously advocated that, informed by its own history, human rights should be the light that guides South Africa’s foreign policy. Much of the criticism of South Africa’s foreign policy over the past 30 years has centred on how its external relations have not been sufficiently informed by value-driven motivations.
Now, it seems, domestic opinion has shifted — with criticisms focusing on the government’s apparent lack of interest in how its foreign policy actions are affecting the domestic economic situation.
Bystander to genocide
It appears, based on what has become popular mainstream commentary, that we should be less concerned about South Africa being a bystander to genocide than about maintaining good relations with the Trump administration, whatever the moral cost.
In reality, South African foreign policy should not be reduced to a mutually exclusive choice between moral and material objectives. Diplomacy is a long-term and complex game, involving the painstaking building and maintenance of relationships, with most of it happening behind the scenes and out of view of the media, casual commentators and the majority of politicians.
The interpretation of it should not be reduced to personalities and short-term events. DM
André Stemmet is a retired legal adviser at Dirco, and currently a senior research fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law at the University of Johannesburg.
Karen Smith is a former UN assistant secretary-general and special adviser to the UN secretary-general on the responsibility to protect. She currently teaches International Relations at Leiden University and is a research fellow at the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University.
Adv Adila Hassim, Dirco Minister Ronald Lamola (centre) and Vusi Madonsela (right) South African ambassador to the Netherlands, at the International Court of Justice in The Hague on 11 January 2024 before the hearing of the genocide case SA brought against Israel. (Photo: Remko de Waal / EPA-EFE)