A large quantity of South African citrus fruit destined for the EU. (Photo: Darren Stewart / Gallo Images) 
South Africa’s citrus industry is its largest agricultural export industry, and the country is the world’s second-largest exporter of citrus fruit. The European Union (EU) has consistently accounted for approximately 40% of South Africa’s exports, amounting to around 64-68 million 15kg cartons annually, primarily during Europe’s off-season.
Since 2023, citrus growers have had to spend almost R4-billion per year to comply with the additional EU import restrictions. Required cold storage upgrades and intensified inspection and certification requirements have especially affected smaller farmers, who account for more than one-third of South Africa’s citrus exports.
The reason for the new restrictions? Plant health rules targeting two threats — the false codling moth (FCM) and citrus black spot (CBS), a fungal disease — which the EU claims pose a risk of introduction and spread to European citrus. South Africa sees something else: regulatory measures that appear to lack sufficient scientific justification, impose disproportionate compliance requirements and place strain on a key export sector.
What sparked the citrus challenge, and where are we now?
In April 2022, the EU intensified CBS-related import conditions, and in June 2022 introduced temporary emergency measures for FCM, followed by permanent measures, replacing the previously accepted systems approach with rigid cold treatment protocols.
The temporary FCM rules applied even to shipments already in transit, resulting in dozens of South African citrus containers being stopped at EU ports. For exporters already facing rising costs, inspection delays, and regulatory uncertainty, this escalation marked a turning point, prompting South Africa, on 27 July 2022, to initiate its first-ever World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute over the FCM rules. A second challenge followed in April 2024 over CBS.
Consultations have failed to resolve either dispute. At South Africa’s request, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body agreed to establish panels to hear both cases, though panellists have yet to be appointed. South Africa does not challenge the goal of plant health, but questions whether the EU’s specific measures comply with its obligations under the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), particularly on scientific justification, transparency and non-discrimination.
Are these measures really about plant health?
Under the SPS Agreement, import restrictions must be science-based, proportionate and non-discriminatory. South Africa argues that the EU’s measures fail this test, while the EU maintains they are justified by risk assessments carried out by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).
Much of the underlying scientific data come from South African researchers, and parties recognise the existence of FCM and CBS. However, South Africa contends that the regulatory response was disproportionate to the established risk, raising legal concerns under WTO law
First, while there have been documented FCM larvae interceptions, the EU’s measures appear more trade-restrictive than necessary. South Africa’s enhanced systems approach achieves high pest freedom, yet the EU imposed additional rigid cold treatment requirements.
Less trade-restrictive options, like recognising pest-free zones or tailoring measures to seasonal conditions, were not adopted, and the lack of specific recommendations for stricter measures in the EU’s risk assessment further weakens the case for escalation.
In the CBS case, the scientific debate over whether fruit without leaves poses a viable pathway for fungal spread remains unresolved.
Second, the EU has not applied its protection levels consistently. In the FCM case, Israel was removed from the regulation’s scope without explanation. In the CBS case, Brazil, Uruguay and Zimbabwe received temporary exemptions from certain conditions that continued to apply to South Africa, despite comparable risk profiles.
Third, the structure and timing of the measures raise concern that they may function as disguised trade restrictions, prohibited under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. Three indicators support this view.
First, in the CBS case, South African citrus imports face stricter controls than domestic produce, despite reported trace detections of Phyllosticta citricarpa (the CBS pathogen) in southern Europe, including Italy and Portugal, which the EFSA has not confirmed as evidence of establishment.
Second, in the FCM case, mandatory cold treatment was imposed despite very low interception rates and no direct recommendation from EFSA for such measures.
Third, both sets of restrictions took effect during the European off-season, when South African citrus enters the EU market. Spain, the EU’s dominant citrus producer, has a clear interest in limiting counter-seasonal competition.
These patterns suggest that the measures, though formally justified on phytosanitary grounds, may in substance serve to protect EU producers from external competition.
A bigger picture: Global trade rules and reciprocal risks
The citrus disputes raise broader questions about the credibility and functionality of global trade rules. When precautionary plant health measures are not regularly reviewed, grounded in updated evidence and consistently applied, they risk becoming persistent barriers to trade, especially for developing countries.
The WTO’s SPS Agreement was designed to strike a balance between biosecurity and trade facilitation. But in practice, powerful economies may impose and export contested rules with limited scrutiny. Moldova, for example, recently adopted citrus import rules aligned with EU standards, illustrating how contested regulatory approaches can extend their influence beyond the EU itself.
Meanwhile, the United States has introduced new citrus tariffs, placing further pressure on South Africa’s exporters and its regional neighbours, including Zimbabwe and Eswatini. In this context, securing stable and rules-based market access to the EU is not merely a legal concern; it is a strategic priority.
Yet, legal assertiveness comes with risks. As South Africa challenges the EU citrus measures, it must also maintain credibility across other sectors, including in poultry, where its import restrictions and disease control measures have drawn criticism from trading partners.
What needs to change and why it matters beyond citrus
Resolving disputes like these does not require weakening plant health standards, but rather clarifying legal obligations: What constitutes sufficient evidence? When do precautionary measures require review? How should consistency be assessed across comparable risk scenarios?
Ensuring that SPS measures do not become disguised trade barriers demands transparency in risk assessment, the consistent application of WTO obligations, and equal treatment of similarly situated exporters. For African exporters, the citrus disputes test whether global trade rules can meaningfully constrain discriminatory or opaque measures, and whether legal tools can support more inclusive market access.
If international trade rules are to retain their legitimacy, they must protect plant health, without becoming barriers dressed in scientific clothing. DM
Franziska Sucker is an associate professor at the School of Law and co-assistant dean (Postgraduate Affairs) at the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand. Biandri Joubert is a consultant in international trade and agricultural regulation.