One thing I find a little lacking in the Western media, very understandably, is what you might call a vituperative-free underpinning to reporting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Even I, as a critic – more than a critic, an angry detractor – can see there are more reasons why Russia might decide to invade Ukraine than I have read in the Western media.

One obvious reason is historic. Russia has been invaded by a European power once a century, every century, for the past four centuries. Of course, this was all a long time ago. But on the most recent occasion – and estimates vary – Russia lost at least 16 million of its citizens, and 15% of its entire population (though some of that was attributable to Stalin’s genocidal tendencies and the gulags). Anyway, when that happens, you tend to not forget about it very quickly.

Of course, it should be noted that Russia has also invaded at least one country in the West once a century or so since 1600. (1755 – Germany; 1792 – Poland; 1914 – Germany; 1939 – Finland, Romania and Poland). But none of these compares in scale to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia in 1941. Whether you think it’s rational (I don’t) or paranoid, which thug states are inclined towards, Russia’s commitment to having a secure western border is something to take into account.

Control over Eurasian steppe

The second factor, and this might be surprising, is geography. Tactically, Russia’s geographic priority on its western flank is to control the Eurasian steppe. This is the mostly flat piece of land that begins on Germany’s east and gradually widens out to the point where it is practically undefendable from a ground invasion – at least in summer, as the Germans and the French both found out to their huge cost.

There was once a choke point in the gradual expansion of the steppe between the Carpathians in the south and the Baltic Sea in the north. That line is roughly contiguous with the eastern border of Poland. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen country after country move closer and closer to the West, to the extent that this choke point really doesn’t exist any more.

So now, should a western ground attack occur, it would have to come through Georgia or Ukraine. This helps to explain, in part, the conflicts between Russia, on the one hand, and Georgia and Ukraine on the other. If you recall how desperately (and viciously) the Russians put down the uprising in Chechnya in the 1990s, that was presumably motivated by the desire to keep pro-Western governments south of the Carpathians. And in case you are wondering why Belarus is siding with Russia, the geographic answer is that were Ukraine to join Nato, Belarus would be surrounded on three sides in open territory by Nato states. Not a happy situation.

Economics

And of course, economics are at play too. As it happens, and as we are seeing as the war progresses, the Russian and Chinese economies are extremely compatible; the oil and gas (and, by the way, the water) China needs are available in high quantities from Russia, and the tech and manufactured products Russia needs are available from China. Bilateral trade between Russia and China hit a record of $190-billion in 2022. Crude oil, LNG and gas exports are all up substantially as Russia pivots away from Europe – and Europe closes the taps.

This is just a brief, discursive view, bearing in mind other factors are also at play, but these are arguably at least a few of the most important background issues in the current conflict from Russia’s and China’s points of view. But the question is, will the alliance between China and Russia last?

I think there are good reasons it won’t. Russia and China both want the global dominance of the US clipped back, so they have that in common. But their tactics in doing so are very different. I suspect China’s critique of Russia’s methodology with its surprise attack on Ukraine is not about the war as such; it’s the way it’s being conducted and that it is lasting too long.

Second Cold War

China’s underlying tactic was to creep up on the US, economically and militarily, gradually consolidating its position and improving its technology over time. Very sensible, very Chinese. Russia’s actions in Ukraine will inevitably mean huge upgrades to US military tech, exactly what China does not want. The US has never underspent on military tech, but you can imagine the ecstatic joy at the moment in the boardrooms of Lockheed, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman about the advent of the Second Cold War. It’s my guess that this is what the Ukraine conflict will be known as in the future; the start of the resumption of belligerent nation-state competition. 

China’s desire for peace in Ukraine is based on the desire to get back to that strategy. But, particularly if Russia is repelled, it would complicate China’s desire to reincorporate Taiwan. They wouldn’t want their brethren across the strait getting any big ideas, and as the war is progressing, this is what we’re seeing. Russia would probably like to comply, but at this point, the war is too evenly balanced for them to give in just yet. We will see.

The problem for Russia is that as history progresses, its junior role in that “friendship” will become more and more apparent. It already has the character of a dependency rather than a balanced alliance; the very fact that Putin is meeting Xi in person is in some ways evidence of the changing nature of the relationship. How long and to what extent will Russians be happy with being Chinese playthings? Hard question, but now they may have no choice.

Treaty of Tientsin

What intrigues me most about the relationship is whether anyone in the Chinese administration would ever have the audacity to bring up the question of the Treaty of Tientsin. The treaty was one of the biggest of what China now considers to be “unequal treaties” in its history which happened in what it calls the Century of Humiliation. That treaty, along with the subsequent Convention of Peking, among other things, formally gave Russia a huge slice of Outer Manchuria (not to be confused with Outer Mongolia) including access to the Sea of Japan through its major Pacific port, Vladivostok.

I mean, if the legal basis for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine vests in the notion of “historic rights” rather than legal treaties, wouldn’t the Chinese have the right to take back their territory?

Russia signed two treaties recognising Ukraine’s borders, the 1997 Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. But that didn’t restrain it from grabbing parts of Ukraine to which it considers it has “historic rights”. So why should the Chinese be barred by the triviality of the Treaty of Tientsin from reclaiming their “historic rights” to Outer Manchuria which were vested in the Qing dynasty? Mao Zedong certainly didn’t think China should be so restrained.

Just before the invasion, Xi and Putin said there was “no limit” to their friendship. Trust me, there are limits. On both sides. DM/BM