So thoroughly have South Africa’s security and intelligence services been corrupted and repurposed that if they were an ailing person in need of psychological diagnosis, one would immediately offer “pathological liar”.

And so we must treat information that the cellphones of State Security Minister Ayanda Dlodlo and her deputy, Zizi Kodwa, as well as those of several other ministry officials, had been “cloned”, with the prerequisite caution.

So too reports that “an undisclosed sum” of money, as well as classified documents, had been stolen from the safe of the State Security Offices in Pretoria in January in what is believed to have been “an inside job”.

That is what unfortunately happens when state institutions are unconstitutionally repurposed, plundered, corrupted and weaponised as political tools in factional battles. 

The security needs of the South African Republic play second fiddle to those who have climbed the greasy pole of politics and personal power, and this is especially so in the murky and unaccountable world that passes for South African intelligence.

The phone “cloning” story first surfaced on 26 February 2020, in Independent Group titles. The incident was later confirmed by department spokesperson Mava Scott who told News24 that the matter had been reported to the Gauteng SAPS, which had “allocated high-profile investigators to look into the matter”.

On the surface, this would appear to be perfectly reasonable until one pauses to grasp for logic and to ask the question: Why take it to the SAPS? Surely the State Security Agency has its own counter-intelligence capacity?

Until you realise that its own counter-intelligence capacity might not be on the books at all and that the Special Operations Unit (SOU), headed by “Zuma’s spy” Thulani Dlomo and its 186 “rogue agents” have still not been rounded up by law enforcement agencies. 

This is despite evidence to the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture and the findings of the High-Level Panel Review report on state security which found the SOU was being run as a private, parallel and unconstitutional unit reporting only to Jacob Zuma while paid for by the citizens.

In fact, it was the inspector-general of intelligence himself who revealed, during a conversation with the public protector, that about 186 rogue SSA agents were still out there somewhere, operating merrily, unaccountable to the SSA or anyone else. They had access to safe houses stuffed to the rafters with cash.

So, what do we know about the phone cloning?

The lore so far is that a “message” appeared to have been sent from Kodwa’s mobile phone to other staffers in the department. It is an important detail as these are ministry and not SSA staff.

Kodwa has insisted he did not send the message and it was this that led to the “discovery” that the phones of the ministers and officials had been “cloned”. Of course, it would shed a tiny shard of light should Deputy Minister Kodwa share the message sent from his phone. It would provide a vital clue as to the intention of the cloners.

When the message was sent and how the cloning of the ministers’ phones, as well as that of other officials, was discovered would also help to unravel the tight knot of smoke and mirrors.

But perhaps something is being pre-empted here? 

Perhaps, in time, some sort of message will surface and when it does Kodwa will be able to respond whether this is/was the message sent from his “cloned” phone.

The most baffling question is, why hand the matter to the SAPS when the SSA should surely have some sort of relatively reliable counter-intelligence capacity despite the deep rot? Are there no ethical members who can be relied on?

Maybe not.

Experts in the field are in agreement that once suspicions have been raised that a phone or device has been cloned the best and most logical course would be to keep it quiet, set a trap and bust the snooper. 

Detective work 101.

One would imagine that the Ministry of State Security and its staff would have sophisticated encryption software on their government-issued phones. Whoever it was that allegedly cloned the phones themselves must have been in possession of sophisticated systems. 

Which points to the rogue SOU and Dlomo, with the SOU’s immense capacity built up over years.

So, are Dlodlo and Kodwa the targets of a disinformation campaign?

While Dlodlo came out in a full-throated support of ANC SG Ace Magashule in 2018, she is known to be “flexible”. 

Dlodlo has been in reported conflict with SSA domestic branch head Mahlodi Muofhe. The SSA acting head, Loyiso Jafta, too is viewed as being a Thuma Mina acolyte.

There are those who are of the opinion that the High-Level Panel Review report did not go far enough. Sure, it exposed the whole shadow world of Zuma’s private army of spies who blew billions in taxpayers’ money, but the institution itself should have been disbanded

It has been a long time coming.

We should not only blame Zuma for the mess which continues to place South Africa’s national security at risk every day.

As Professor Jane Duncan noted in her 2018 book Stopping the Spies – Constructing and resisting the surveillance state in South Africa, the rot is not episodic but systemic.  The illegal spying on domestic political groupings as well as anyone else in the republic has virtually been normalised for more than 20 years.

Duncan notes that the downhill trajectory began around 2003 when “the Thabo Mbeki presidency required an expansion of the NIA’s mandate, resulting in a directive that included political and economic intelligence. 

“In the case of political intelligence, the NIA was to focus on the ‘strengths and the weaknesses of political formations, their constitutions and plans, political figures and their role in governance’,” said Duncan.

By 2004, the intelligence service had ballooned in size and personnel and accounted for an unsustainable 74% of the total domestic intelligence budget. 

In 2005, “signs emerged that intelligence operatives were becoming embroiled in the factional battles in the ANC: a problem that was proved to exist by a commission of inquiry which partly blamed the culture of secrecy in the intelligence services as the problem”.

These are dangerous times.

A tipping point will soon be reached as the vast, deep and dangerous network of corrupt officials – most of whom belong to the ruling party – across all government departments are exposed and their pipelines to unlimited illicit funds are slowly being shut off in an attempt to bring South Africa back from the brink. 

In the meantime, always remember, where there is smoke, there are mirrors, and often a raging fire. DM