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Let’s cut to the chase.
John Steenhuisen may well have to leave the Agriculture Ministry. Not because President Cyril Ramaphosa believes he has failed. Not because the Constitution demands it. And not necessarily because his performance warrants dismissal.
He may have to go because the Democratic Alliance has concluded that he has become politically inconvenient.
That is the real politics at play.
The debate over Steenhuisen’s future has less to do with constitutional powers or ministerial performance than with electoral positioning before the 2026 local government elections and the DA’s concern about retaining parts of its traditional support base.
Agriculture occupies a unique place in South African politics. It is not merely a government portfolio; it is a symbolic and strategic constituency touching commercial farmers, agribusiness, rural communities and, crucially for the DA, many Afrikaans-speaking voters. These voters are concentrated not only in metropolitan areas such as Tshwane, but also across the Western Cape, the Southern Cape, vast stretches of the Karoo and other rural regions where agricultural politics remains deeply influential.
Foot-and-mouth disease
Whether justified or not, the perception among sections of the farming community that the government’s response to foot-and-mouth disease has been inadequate appears to have become politically significant. Politics is often driven less by objective performance than by how performance is perceived.
Viewed through that lens, the pressure around Steenhuisen begins to make more political sense. Agriculture is not merely a Cabinet portfolio. It has become a proxy for wider concerns about voter management, constituency maintenance and the DA’s positioning before the next local government elections.
There are signs that the DA’s right flank is becoming more vulnerable. The concern is not theoretical. According to the South African By-Election Tracker, a monthly electoral tracker compiled by Gareth van Onselen, the FF Plus has been improving its performance in recent by-elections and remains competitive in a growing number of conservative constituencies.
In the January 2026 by-election in Tshwane’s Ward 57, centred on Lyttelton and Centurion, the FF Plus surged from roughly 16% support to about 44%, dramatically reducing the DA’s winning margin. More significantly, the FF Plus reportedly won several of the ward’s most heavily Afrikaans voting districts. One by-election does not establish a trend, but it illustrates why the DA cannot simply dismiss the possibility of conservative voters migrating to its right.
At the same time, the party faces pressure from the Patriotic Alliance in parts of the Western Cape, particularly in communities where the DA has historically expected support to come naturally.
The PA presents a different challenge. According to Van Onselen’s tracker, the PA has expanded its by-election footprint significantly in the current electoral cycle, suggesting a party increasingly capable of competing in communities where the DA once expected support. The danger is not that the DA loses Cape Town. The danger is that future growth becomes harder to achieve.
Politics is ultimately about power
The DA is learning what the ANC, and indeed most successful political parties, have long understood: politics is ultimately about power. Realpolitik has replaced some of the naivety that once characterised the party’s approach to governance and coalition building. The objective is no longer merely to hold office, but to retain constituencies, manage risks and maximise electoral advantage.
In that respect, the DA is increasingly behaving as governing parties do. It is seeking to shape outcomes within the Government of National Unity (GNU) and impose its political priorities in much the same way that alliance partners, factions and organised interests have sought to influence governments throughout SA’s democratic history.
All of this is understandable politics.
What is less clear is why it should take the DA to initiate a discussion about the removal of a Cabinet minister. Why must it take the DA to initiate the agriculture minister’s removal? I accept that coalition partners lobby, negotiate and exert pressure. That is politics.
But the Constitution does not recognise shared accountability for Cabinet appointments. It recognises presidential accountability. Whether Steenhuisen stays or goes, that is Ramaphosa’s decision.
Defenders of the GNU will argue that coalition government necessarily involves consultation, negotiation and compromise. They are correct. But consultation is not the same thing as the delegation of constitutional responsibility.
If Ramaphosa believed Steenhuisen’s performance warranted dismissal, the Constitution gives him the sole authority to act. He has had that authority from the day Steenhuisen was appointed. Are we really to believe that the president saw no reason to intervene until others raised the issue?
One can fully accept the political realities of the GNU while still asking whether the president is exercising the leadership expected of him. The existence of a political agreement may explain political pressure. It does not alter the constitutional position.
Ramaphosa remains fully responsible for the composition of his Cabinet.
Ramaphosa’s leadership style
That may be the most revealing aspect of this episode. It tells us something about the internal workings of the GNU, but it also tells us something about Ramaphosa’s leadership style: a tendency to accommodate competing interests, avoid direct confrontation and allow political pressure to shape decisions that constitutionally belong to him alone.
The DA’s behaviour is easy to understand. Political parties exist to win elections, retain constituencies and protect their interests. What is harder to understand is why South Africans increasingly seem prepared to accept that the president’s constitutional responsibilities can be outsourced to coalition partners.
The GNU may explain the pressure on Ramaphosa. It does not relieve him of accountability.
If Steenhuisen stays, that is Ramaphosa’s decision. If Steenhuisen goes, that is Ramaphosa’s decision. The moment we start treating the president as an implementer of other people’s preferences rather than the principal decision maker, we raise uncomfortable questions about who is actually governing. DM
Electoral trend data referenced in this article is drawn from Gareth van Onselen’s The South African By-Election Tracker (Volume 3, May 2026).