It’s easy to forget that once upon a time the ANC did some good things for service delivery. The traditional analysis of South Africa’s post-apartheid corruption wave, especially among liberal commentators, rested too heavily on the fact of the ANC’s electoral dominance to explain it – and in doing so, underplayed the contribution of the mass-based political movement for state delivery, which mandated a then-dominant ANC to decisively improve access to services. (Maintenance of infrastructure didn’t go so well).
The point here is not that electoral majorities are intrinsically good for delivery, or that coalitions are intrinsically bad. It is too early in South Africa’s young democracy to make firm long-term predictions about whether our newly competitive politics will improve democratic responsiveness and service delivery, especially at the local level. But so far, it hasn’t.
In part this speaks to the character of this new political competitiveness, which has emerged in response to frustrations with delivery failure, but which has also been driven by the fragmentation of the ANC. And this, in turn, is a function of intraparty competition for the resources of office. This competition has torn at the fabric of the party, weakening party coherence, and, over the past decade or so, it has torn at the coherence and capacities of the state apparatus it controls. This dynamic is not confined to the ANC. It is now a structural feature of our politics, and our political economy. It has contributed to coalition instability, even where coalition partners are not significantly divided by political priority and ideology.
Other dynamics have contributed to instability: witness, for example, the destabilising role of smaller kingmaker parties in Johannesburg. The Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s (Mistra) recent Coalitions Barometer shows that governments formed without the participation of the party with the most votes collapse at four times the rate of those that included the party. (The Department of Cooperative Governance has just released a set of non-binding guidelines for municipalities aimed at improving the stability of coalitions, and the Coalitions Bill is now before Parliament).
City officials in Gauteng metros have told the Public Affairs Research Institute in recent years that more frequent changes in leadership and leadership priorities, and shifting budget allocations, have affected goal clarity and planning. Even where delivery is not stymied by corruption in tenders, the operating environment for those in the administration is now very complicated. It is not impossible for a skilled municipal manager to navigate these shifting priorities and multiple political principals, but not easy. They need to be keeping an eye on the formal coalition agreement, formal council decisions, the unwritten preferences and tensions in and across party caucuses, the whims of individual mayoral committee members, and the broader informal patronage pressures that are exerted on both political and administrative decisions.
Senior managers in many of our cities and towns are also now operating on very short time horizons, as coalitions change sometimes within election cycles, and not just between them. According to Mistra’s barometer, half of all municipal administrations in their dataset ended within about 21 months of being formed. The development literature suggests that these short time horizons will tend to limit incentives and political space to develop long-term growth-enhancing and socially transformative programmes. (This was arguably a problem for many municipalities under conditions of intraparty factionalism too, but in the metros many of these administrations were more stable a decade ago).
Stability
To the extent that coalition messiness need not prevent routine state delivery in our cities and towns, it does require some stability of the administrative apparatus – so forging the conditions for better insulation of operating capacities in the administration is an obvious policy response, and arguably the area with more potential impact than “regulating’ coalitions. There are some solid suggestions in this regard in the recently updated White Paper on Local Government: these include reformed processes for appointing municipal managers and other senior staff (with independent checks on full political discretion in selection panels), regulations around what kinds of instructions can be provided by political principals to administrators, and improvements in delegations frameworks. Cabinet has now adopted the new white paper – how much support will we find among politicians at national or local level for implementing these important reforms?
It is possible that coalition politics has, in fact, added a further pressure for politicisation of the administration, especially in local government. My argument is that as new parties enter government, they face a set of incumbent officials they don’t necessarily trust, a set of procurement contracts they did not negotiate or oversee (they are only supposed to do the latter) and a short time horizon in office. There is more incentive for political overreach – either for delivery or for patronage payoffs to a now complex group of coalition partners (or both). Herman Mashaba’s period as Johannesburg mayor illustrated this dynamic.
It doesn’t help matters that the penetration of organised crime into city administrations adds a daunting layer of complexity and risk for any senior manager wanting to push institutional reform.
If this outline seems depressing, the future isn’t cast in stone. South Africa has 213 local municipalities, with 138 of them hung – and across these cities and towns are variations in local political and administrative histories, leadership, and in capacities for social mobilisation. We now enter a period of potential social and political experimentation. In Gauteng, Tshwane’s delivery record has not taken the nosedive that Johannesburg’s has in the recent years, despite being subject to similar structural realities, and its financial position has improved slightly. Do variations like these suggest room for manoeuvre against structural constraints? Coalition governments, after all, are the default setting in plenty of well-run cities and towns around the world. Our councils are hung – hopefully our democracy is not. DM

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