Blood on the tender: Why municipal councillors keep dying in South Africa

One of the biggest risks to local democracy and government in South Africa is the ongoing murder of municipal councillors. Although political assassinations are frequently portrayed as ideological disputes or struggles for political dominance, the truth is much more alarming.

These murders frequently have little to do with conflicting ideologies, differing policies or divergent outlooks on South Africa’s future. Instead, they are motivated by the politics of rivalry for public resources, factionalism, selfishness in the form of pure greed, and tenderpreneurship. Occupying a political office these days is increasingly seen as a means of gaining access to economic opportunities rather than as a platform for public service in local government.

As a result, patronage networks, supply chain management procedures and procurement systems have become dangerously entwined with municipal politics. As a result, political leaders and council members are now vying for control over public funds, tenders and strategic appointments that decide who gains from government spending rather than just for political power. Together, South Africa’s municipalities oversee billions of rands every year.

Municipalities are increasingly drawing people and groups driven by access to contracts and procurement opportunities rather than leaders driven by public service.

Businesses associated with political elites might profit from infrastructure projects, housing developments, road construction, water distribution, rubbish removal and other public services. Gaining influence over these financial flows has become a prerequisite for obtaining political office in many places. Political competitiveness can swiftly turn into criminal competition when large sums of money are involved.

The emergence of tenderpreneurship has changed the nature of local politics significantly. Municipalities are increasingly drawing people and groups driven by access to contracts and procurement opportunities rather than leaders driven by public service. Networks that anticipate future benefits from government contracts frequently fund political campaigns.

After being elected, competing interests may put pressure on council members to grant them preferred access to municipal resources or bids. Corruption, intimidation and violence thrive in this setting. Refusing to engage with influential networks of patronage could result in the removal, intimidation or isolation of council members. People who obstruct lucrative contracts could be targeted.

In severe situations, assassination turns into a means of removing barriers to financial success. The issue has become worse due to factionalism within political parties. Internal political party disputes in South Africa usually centre more on access to posts that oversee public spending and procurement procedures than on philosophy. Because they have an impact on resource allocation, municipal roles including mayor, municipal manager, chief financial officer and supply chain management officials have become fiercely competitive.

The sad thing is that these factional conflicts are frequently passed off as political disputes when, in truth, they are power fights over the control of economic resources by certain groups of individuals. Political groups don’t always form because of disagreements over governance models, economic theories or developmental strategies. Rather, they often represent rival networks of patronage vying for control over municipal budgets and bidding processes.

Uncomfortable questions concerning the function of cadre deployment and politically related appointments are brought up by this fact. The placement of loyalists in key administrative roles has frequently undermined professional governance, despite political parties’ natural desire to appoint trustworthy people to positions of power. In several towns, appointments seem to be made to protect the power of specific networks over procurement decisions rather than to improve service delivery. As a result, commercial interests, politics and administration come together in a risky way. Chief financial officers, supply chain authorities and municipal administrators can play a crucial role in deciding which businesses are awarded contracts and which are not. As a result, political conflicts affect not just elected officials but also the local government’s administrative apparatus. The tender mechanism itself is at the core of this dilemma. The procurement system in South Africa was created to encourage equity, openness and change. In reality it has frequently become susceptible to bribery, collusion, corruption and manipulation.

There are chances for misuse because some procurement methods allow for a great deal of discretion. It is possible to inflate contracts, modify specifications to favour preferred bidders and weaken oversight procedures. The ultimate prize is now the purse strings.

To lessen potential for manipulation and patronage, the division between administrative and political leadership roles must be strengthened.

Economic opportunities are frequently within the control of local budgets. Because of this reality, political elections become high-stakes battles with significant rewards and potentially dire repercussions for failing. Violence becomes the norm rather than the exception in such a setting. Political leaders and council members are not the sole victims of these murders.

Communities suffer greatly as well. The murder of council members undermines public confidence in democratic institutions, hinders service delivery and destabilises governance. Locals start to perceive politics as a risky competition between rival elites looking to benefit themselves rather than as a means of resolving social issues.

The wider ramifications for democracy are just as alarming. Participating in politics becomes more dangerous. If honest and competent people believe local politics is a violent and intimidating environment, they might be deterred from running for public office.

When public officials are afraid for their lives, democracy cannot thrive. As a result, South Africa’s procurement and tendering processes require a thorough review. Procurement procedures need to be made more accountable, transparent and impervious to political meddling. Law enforcement organisations must actively look into corruption connected to municipal contracts, independent review procedures should be reinforced and procurement decisions should be made publicly available.

The professionalisation of local government management is equally crucial. Competence, honesty and technical know-how should take precedence over political allegiance in municipal appointments. To lessen potential for manipulation and patronage, the division between administrative and political leadership roles must be strengthened. Above all, political parties need to address the patronage culture that has permeated local government.

Factional conflicts and political violence will persist as long as holding public office is seen as a means of achieving personal profit. Serving citizens, not networks of interconnected elites, is the original aim of public service. In the end, the murder of municipal council members is a sign of a more serious problem with governance. It represents a political economy where public service is no longer as valuable as access to state resources.

The violence will go on until South Africa resolves the poisonous connection between politics, procurement and patronage. As long as corruption, greed and the unrelenting pursuit of the tender purse continue to dominate local politics, the country will not be able to construct a capable, moral and progressive state. DM