Beyond the bars of privatisation — lessons from Mangaung and Kutama-Sinthumule prisons

South Africa’s experiment with privatised corrections is rapidly drawing to a close. The 25-year public-private partnership (PPP) contract with Bloemfontein Correctional Contracts (BCC) for the notorious Mangaung Correctional Centre expires at the end of this month, with the Kutama-Sinthumule Correctional Centre in Limpopo set to follow in February next year. Now, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) stands at a critical crossroads.

The Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services’ legislative mandate demands that we look beyond just the administrative handover and confront a more profound reality — the transition of these facilities back to full state control is a defining test of state capacity, accountability and parliamentary oversight.

When these maximum-security facilities were commissioned at the dawn of the millennium, the reasoning seemed logical. South Africa’s prisons were becoming increasingly overcrowded, and the government sought to leverage private-sector expertise to expand accommodation, introduce advanced security infrastructure and improve operational efficiency. In the beginning, reports highlighted modern facilities, improved access to healthcare and structured vocational programmes that would aid rehabilitation and later, social reintegration.

Fundamental flaws

However, we could no longer ignore the fundamental flaws in turning incarceration into a profit-driven enterprise. The idea that public safety and shareholder returns can be perfectly aligned has repeatedly been tested and found wanting.

The inefficiencies of this model were highlighted by glaring institutional failures. All of this under the watch of multinational subcontractor G4S, which was employed by Bloemfontein Correctional Contracts (BCC) to manage Mangaung. The most conspicuous of these was the theatrical 2022 escape of convicted criminal Thabo Bester, a scandal that captivated the nation as details emerged that seemed more fitting for a Hollywood movie script than a South African correctional facility.

Parliamentary hearings and departmental investigations followed the escape. These exposed a disturbing pattern of compromised security, false records and institutional failures. Evidence suggested that officials actively misled investigators and concealed critical information relating to the escape. The incident represented not only a security lapse but also a profound failure of governance and accountability.

Deep systemic challenges

Yet Bester’s escape was only the clearest demonstration of deeper systemic problems. For years, Mangaung has been dogged by allegations of serious human rights violations. This includes claims of electroshock torture and the forced administration of antipsychotic medication, to name but a few.

Last year, we saw the death of inmate Mpho Mkhumbeni from blunt force trauma and pepper spray exposure. This highlighted ongoing concerns about non-compliance with operating procedures. It brought to the surface a culture of impunity and allegations of evidence tampering. Reports of suicides by inmates have exacerbated concerns about conditions within the centre.

Recent legal developments have added another layer of concern to the Mangaung saga. The Gauteng High Court in Pretoria recently set aside the Department of Correctional Services’ (DCS’) 2022 intervention at the facility following the Bester escape. The court found that the department had not followed certain contractual dispute-resolution processes before assuming control of the facility. The court ordered DCS to repay approximately R1.72-million in contractual credits to BCC.

Important questions

While the judgment does not affect the expiry of the PPP agreement on 30 June or the state’s planned takeover on 1 July, it nevertheless serves as a reminder that the government must always act within the framework of the law, even when responding to serious operational failures. It also raises important questions about the legal and financial costs of the Mangaung debacle, costs that ultimately fall on the taxpayer.

As the state assumes full operational control of these massive facilities, the portfolio committee’s focus is squarely on budgetary realignment and human resource absorption. This transition requires meticulous planning and execution. It requires redirecting an estimated R45-million per month currently allocated through the PPP arrangement into the department’s operational budget within the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework.

On the human resources front, the logistical scale is immense and concerning. Approximately 780 posts are required. More than 660 centre-based positions have been advertised, and 60 emergency support team officials have been deployed to conduct gang profiling and assist in stabilising the maximum-security environment.

The committee is, however, seriously concerned about the pace of recruitment. Only weeks before the handover, key appointments were still outstanding. We have consistently identified delayed recruitment as one of the department’s recurring weaknesses and have cautioned that vacancies in a maximum-security environment pose significant operational risks.

Another worrying factor is the ongoing Labour Court disputes regarding the possible absorption of more than 500 current G4S employees. Our position remains clear. Appointments require intense screening, vetting and assessment. Automatic absorption cannot be assumed where public safety is concerned. Mangaung’s notorious past has raised legitimate questions about the calibre and suitability of some personnel operating within the centre. The state has an obligation to ensure that those entrusted with the custody and rehabilitation of offenders meet the highest professional standards.

The closure of the multibillion-rand PPP agreements offers a vital blueprint for the future of governance in South Africa. It reminds us that certain sovereign responsibilities cannot simply be outsourced. The administration of justice and the rehabilitation of offenders are core functions of the state that demand direct accountability to the public.

The return of Mangaung and Kutama-Sinthumule to the DCS should therefore not be seen merely as an enlargement of the public sector. It should instead serve as a national commitment to building a correctional system that is transparent, secure, constitutional and focused on human dignity.

Lessons learned

Success will not be measured simply by new management — it will be measured by whether the state can demonstrate that it has learned the lessons of the past: that security failures, human rights abuses and weak accountability mechanisms will not be repeated. And most importantly, that Parliament’s watchdog role will ensure that correctional centres operate in the interests of the public rather than a corporate balance sheet.

The end of the Mangaung and Kutama-Sinthumule PPPs marks the end of an era. What follows must be the beginning of a more accountable correctional system worthy of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. And one thing is as clear as daylight — let’s not make the mistake again — South Africa cannot outsource our security.