Iran, Hobbes and pragmatic ownership — where power can trump the law

The recent conflict involving Iran has renewed interest in questions of the relevance of “International Law”. International waters are theoretically a space where there exists no sovereign jurisdiction and international treaties like Unclos (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) regulate the area.

These waters are generally “...open to all for freedom of navigation, fishing, research and laying cables”. Iran’s intervention in the Strait of Hormuz renegotiates whether International Law is predicated more on law or power.

What does it mean to possess something?

Ownership is typically understood in legal or institutional terms, physical possession, written recognition, or socially enforced expectation (famously articulated by Jeremy Bentham). However, a different kind of ownership, namely a pragmatic type, should be considered. A person may lack entirely legal or institutional ownership over a resource, but exercise effective control over it.

Suppose that someone has a Montblanc pen that I covet. If I were to just take it and refuse to give it back, keeping it for myself, in the eyes of the law, I do not own it. Yet, unless an authority intervenes, the line between control and ownership becomes unclear and pragmatically, ownership becomes contingent on enforcement.

Exempli causa, the Strait of Hormuz, a vital passage for oil to reach the rest of the world from the Middle East. While Iran to the north and Oman to the south both have the Strait of Hormuz within their territorial waters, it has remained an international waterway, governed by international maritime law (Unclos Convention).

Despite the sovereignty of its own waters, Iran may not stop ships from passing through. At its narrowest, the strait is about 21 nautical miles wide, and since territorial waters extend 12 miles from the coast, Iran and Oman occupy the entire strait. This is where the “transit passage” is introduced.

Loosely, it states that despite territorial jurisdiction, ships must be allowed to pass through international straits. Iran has no recognised ownership of the strait; however, it does (as displayed) have the capacity to threaten and disrupt the area. The global markets have affirmed this reality.

The tension erupted when Iran, as of early March 2026, began laying mines – with its navy patrolling to ensure strict compliance with its dictates.

Iran’s effective closure-by-force constitutes a pragmatic ownership of the area – where control without intervention bleeds over into ownership. I argue that despite a lack of de jure ownership, Iran exercises de facto control and thus possesses the Strait of Hormuz.

The analogy of the fountain pen seeks to illustrate that although someone can control something, to the point where they de facto own it, this lasts only as long as they have the power to possess it. Iran can claim ownership of the strait. However, it hinges entirely on its power, its ability to exercise this control.

Iran echoed on a global level a Hobbesian insight, that where there is no sovereign (the picture of ultimate authority), humans exist in what he terms a “state of nature”, where the reality of the condition is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. Briefly consider the South China Sea, Russia and Crimea, Israel and the Golan Heights. Iran’s actions constitute just the most recent case in a long history.

Power constitutes ownership, but power is fickle and ownership lasts only as long as power does. Law is eternally the bulwark against unchecked power. However, re vera, International Law could not protect the Strait of Hormuz – power prevailed (even if it is only to be temporary).

International Law, the treatises of the ocean, occupy a quasi-Hobbesian condition – despite the existence of these treaties and laws, there is no genuine authority to enforce them universally.

International Law, lacking an ultimate judge (sovereign), resembles this Hobbesian state of nature – treaties thus behave more like conventions than law.

To borrow one last time from Hobbes, “Covenants without the sword are but words.”

Power begets control, control produces pragmatic ownership, and the law is evoked when power deems it convenient. DM

Joshua de Jongh is a philosophy, linguistics and psychology student at Stellenbosch University.