The foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) among cattle in South Africa has spread aggressively since 2019, affecting eight of the country’s nine provinces and severely disrupting the commercial livestock value chain in many areas.
The disease has resulted in lost gross production value and affected animal welfare, while the emotional toll on livestock and dairy producers has been massive.
Many producers will face financial disaster. It is therefore no wonder that industry role players and farmers are up in arms and very angry.
This is well understood, but what is worrying is that everybody seems to suddenly be expert on the disease. However, there are only a few experts and veterinarians in SA who have successfully dealt with previous outbreaks of FMD. We sat down with one expert, Dr Gideon Brückner, to get his views on the current mudslinging and accusations being thrown around.
He immediately drew our attention to the rules and guidelines of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) on the treatment of FMD. South Africa is a signatory to this agreement and must comply with the rules if it wants to get its FMD-free status back. Dr Brückner was also the head of WOAH for many years after completing years of service as the director of veterinary services in the Department of Agriculture.
International standards
He totally agrees with the decision by the state to control vaccine production and imports. Minister John Steenhuisen is absolutely right in doing this. There is more than enough support for it in the WOAH international standards, as well as in the Animal Diseases Act of 1984. There are therefore more than enough aspects from international agreements that go against the unsubstantiated claims made by Sakeliga (an independent business organisation) and the Southern African Agricultural Initiative.
The essence of the argument is that there is no objection if private veterinarians assist with the vaccination. However, the procurement of vaccines, and monitoring of where and what and how many animals have been vaccinated, must be strictly monitored by the state to maintain its reputation and standards internationally. This is necessary if the plan is to apply again, after the waiting period is over, for SA to be declared free of foot-and-mouth disease by WOAH. If there is no order and no controlled processes, we will never get that important status back again, and our export markets for red meat will remain closed!
More importantly, however, if vaccines where inactivation was inadequate are purchased by anybody, they could result in the introduction of unwanted FMD viruses that could cause more than a national disaster. This is because all split-hoofed animals in SA (including wildlife) are naïve to any other FMD virus except the SAT 1,2 and 3 strains, and thus are all highly susceptible. In particular, the O strain that is not present here could cause chaos because it is a highly virulent, highly contagious virus that is also very pathogenic in pigs. This is the same virus that was illegally introduced into KZN in 2001 and that we were able to eradicate quickly through total slaughter. There are suspicions that it may already be in the vaccines illegally imported from Kenya.
WOAH guidelines on vaccines
From all the anger expressed on social media it is clear to us that very few people know about WOAH’s guidelines on vaccines. We provide some relevant extracts from their guidelines to ensure people understand that there is some legal merit for the state’s actions:
Chapter 1.1.8 of the WOAH Terrestrial Manual provides clear directions on how each government should deal with a disease and the release of vaccines:
Before release of a vaccine for use in a country, relevant regulatory approval must be requested from and be assessed and authorised by the competent authority to ensure compliance with local product regulatory requirements.
Starting materials to be used, manufacturing steps, in-process controls and controls on the finished product before release by a responsible person should be described in the dossier for relevant regulatory approval, as should be the necessary tests to demonstrate quality, safety and efficacy of the vaccine.
After the relevant regulatory approval has been granted by a competent authority, the industrial production can be launched in a manufacturing site which is authorised by the competent authority in accordance with national requirements and having the relevant equipment, facilities and personnel for production and controls. The manufacturing site should be inspected on a regular basis by experienced official inspectors.
A section in the manual specifies clearly how vaccines should be administered:
All veterinary vaccines administered to animals should be tested for field safety and, if feasible, for efficacy in the field, before being authorised for general use. Field studies are designed to demonstrate safety and efficacy under conditions of normal environment, care and use, and should detect unexpected reactions, including mortality that may not have been observed during the development of the product.
Under field conditions there are many uncontrollable variables that make it difficult to obtain good efficacy data, but demonstration of safety is more reliable. The tests should be done on the host animal, at a variety of geographical locations, using appropriate numbers of susceptible animals.
The test animals should represent all the ages and husbandry practices for which the product is indicated; unvaccinated controls must be included. The product tested should be two or more typical production batches/serials. A protocol should be developed indicating the observation methods and the recording methods.
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Chapter 3.1.8 of the Terrestrial Manual on FMD vaccines provides further clear direction on strain selection:
Appropriate vaccine strain selection is an important element in the control of FMD and is necessary for the application of vaccination programmes in FMD-affected regions as well as for the establishment and maintenance of vaccine antigen reserves to be used in the event of new FMD incursions. The decision to change or include new strains in vaccine formulations is a multifaceted process and, among other issues, experimental, epidemiological and field observations should be considered.
Vaccination against one serotype of FMDV does not cross-protect against other serotypes and may also fail to protect fully or at all against other strains of the same serotype.
We finally need to correct the false claims made by many organisations and clarify why the state controls FMD vaccination.
First, FMD is a controlled animal disease under the Animal Diseases Act (Act 35 of 1984) and requires the state to act and control. Clause 20 of Act 35 is also of specific relevance in relation to the development and manufacturing of vaccines. The designation of a disease as a controlled animal disease is because any unregulated vaccination can:
- mask infection
- spread virus mechanically
- undermine surveillance
- jeopardise WOAH FMD‑free status
The national strategy stresses that vaccination must be part of a “centrally managed, technically rigorous programme”.
Poor record
Obviously, the poor record of the Department of Agriculture and its provincial departments in managing the FMD disease and other important matters related to animal biosecurity have played into the hands of the hysteria and the unfounded accusations.
Officials in the department have not done themselves any favours, and have in a way contributed to the crisis. As we have highlighted in our book The Uncomforatble Truth About South Africa’s Agriculture, the problems with animal biosecurity in SA have been compounded by persistent institutional failures, including fragmented governance, weak coordination between national and provincial authorities, and systemic challenges in vaccine production, procurement and distribution (e.g. cold-chain infrastructure failures and ageing equipment).
The FMD outbreak is a national crisis and will affect all livestock farmers from very small livestock keepers to the large feedlots, and will have a negative impact on the growth of the industry. It is time that we be responsible, and only let the experts speak on vaccine and disease-related matters. It is also time for the department, once and for all, to get its act together and work collaboratively with people who can manufacture, distribute and apply the vaccines. DM
Kirsten and Sihlobo are with the Department of Agricultural Economics at Stellenbosch University.