Maduro’s no perfect victim — he, too, wanted to invade a less powerful oil-rich nation

When US President Donald Trump declared that his administration would run Venezuela for the purposes of extracting its oil to benefit American companies, he was using language similar to that of his new high-profile prisoner, former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

Just two years before his own illegal capture, Maduro had been eagerly taking steps towards the apparent annexation of his smaller neighbouring country, Guyana.

The specific region he wanted was Essequibo, which represents about two-thirds of the Guyanese territory. The area is also Guyana’s lifeline to economic development, having confirmed oil reserves worth 11 billion barrels there in 2015.

This places the country among the top 18 countries when ranked by reserves (just behind Algeria and ahead of notable producers such as Norway, Angola and Mexico). Production is expected to reach 1.2 million barrels in 2030.

The region is also rich in gold and copper. Most importantly, it is home to some 120,000 Guyanese citizens, or about 15% of its total 800,000 population.

Disdain for international law

For a man who is now being defended through the deployment of international law arguments, Maduro himself showed consistent disdain for it, at least on the question of Essequibo. He did not adhere to the doctrine of uti possidetis iuris (the principle that colonial borders are to be administered as they have been inherited, lest they cause upheaval and conflict) when he dismissed an 1899 ruling by international arbitrators that set the current boundaries between Venezuela and Guyana.

In this regard, he was not the first Venezuelan leader to do so. Caracas has long claimed the territory, going as far back as 1811 when it gained its own independence from Spain. However, Maduro was a standout figure in politicising and escalating the dispute, both domestically and externally, particularly after the discovery of oil there.

In 2018, Guyana approached the International Court of Justice for the dispute to be settled. While the decision is still pending, the then Venezuelan president made it clear that he would not adhere to the outcome if it did not favour his side. Instead, on 3 December 2023, he organised a referendum in which the Venezuelan population was asked five related questions on Essequibo, or Esequiba in Spanish.

One of these was “Do you agree with Venezuela’s historical position of not recognising the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to resolve the territorial controversy over Guayana Esequiba?”

Another question was “Do you agree with the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated plan for comprehensive care for the current and future population of that territory, which includes, among others, the granting of citizenship and identity card? Venezuela, in accordance with the Geneva Agreement and International Law, consequently incorporating said state on the map of Venezuelan territory?”

The Geneva Agreement referred to here, along with vague “International Law,” was a 17 February 1966 treaty that set up, on the eve of British Guyana’s independence, a commission to review the boundary and make recommendations regarding the disputed territories. At best, this shows a selective approach to international law.

All motions passed with a minimum of 96% according to the official results, which reflected a 51% turnout.

Guyana described the move as a clear “existential threat”.

Maduro upped the ante on 5 December, when he unveiled a new map of Venezuela to legislators, which included the disputed territory. He also said the map would be distributed throughout all schools and public buildings in the country, signed a “presidential decree” creating the “High Commission for the Defense of Guayana Esequiba”, and began stationing troops near the Guyanese border.

This created tensions between Maduro and his one-time ally, President Lula da Silva of Brazil, who built up his own military presence along the border with Venezuela.

Following a 14 December 2023 summit between Maduro and his Guyanese counterpart, President Irfaan Ali, in St Vincent and the Grenadines, a joint declaration was issued, with each side stating its position. In Article 4, Guyana asserted its view that the dispute should be resolved by the ICJ, while Venezuela expressed its “lack of consent and lack of recognition of the International Court of Justice and its jurisdiction in the border controversy”.

‘Maduro Doctrine’

This may as well be termed the “Maduro Doctrine”. It rivals his American adversaries in its self-perceived exceptionalism.

A few months later, in April 2024, Maduro signed into law an act that established the state of “Guayana Esequiba” and formally sought to bring it under Venezuelan control. For the rest of 2024, Maduro’s attention turned towards that year’s election campaign, whose results were ultimately disputed, although he held on to power.

When facing down a smaller nation, Maduro was quick to jettison established international law. He may not have gone as far as Trump, but he did contribute, in no insignificant way, to the erosion of the principles which will now be used to defend him: sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of other states.

There are hardly any perfect victims in international politics, and Maduro is certainly not one. But do any of his threats and acts towards Guyana justify the actions taken by the US against him? Absolutely not.

One of the fundamental purposes of law, domestic and international, is the equal protection of all; that includes even those who disregard it. DM

Bhaso Ndzendze is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg. He is the author of Super President: The History and Future of Executive Power in South Africa. He writes in his personal capacity.