The post-World War II era was a time of unprecedented prosperity nominally characterised by a rules-based global economic and political order.

The past tense in the previous sentence is intentional, for the post-World War II era has come to its definitive end. Just as World War II brought about a new world order, Covid-19 too has rattled and ultimately upended the foundations of the as-yet current global political and economic system.

Though the dust has yet to settle, some conclusions are warranted. The first is that the post-World War II era was aberrational and not at all paradigmatic of human history. Pace Francis Fukuyama, far from the end of history, what we are seeing is the return of history: of historical forces and processes so powerful they cannot be overridden by force of will alone.

Whereas the pre-Covid assumption was that human progress – towards liberty, economic prosperity, and global peace – was inevitable and therefore irrevocable, Covid-19 has forced us to re-examine these hubristic assumptions.

As has been repeated ad nauseam, catastrophic events such as Covid-19 do not change the course of history so much as they accelerate it. The retreat of the United States from the global leadership stage is not a temporary phenomenon but an historic one. The current crisis has accelerated but not caused the global leadership vacuum; President Donald Trump is a symptom but not a cause of American disinterest in world affairs. Whomever replaces him in the White House come November will have less say in world affairs than his predecessor. Absent a fundamental rethink of the foundations of American power, this process is set to continue with each succeeding American president.

For better or worse, it does not follow that China will step into the global leadership gap. Which is not to say that China will not continue to increase its role in global affairs. Its economy and hard power will continue to increase until they rival and, eventually, surpass those of the United States. But, absent any appreciable increase in soft power, China will remain incapable of coordinating a truly global replacement for the post-World War II system. Regardless of China’s rise, then, the post-Covid world is likely to end up being a leaderless one.

Without knowing which foreign policy strategy South Africa will adopt to steer its way through this tumultuous future, it is unclear what any of this means for South Africa.

Which is exactly why Covid-19 marks the return of history.

First, it is consistent with the long arc of history that might equals right. Absent the rules-based order backed by American security guarantees, the post-Covid world will be one in which powerful countries coerce and intimidate weak ones in pursuit of their narrow self-interest. We are entering a multipolar world where China and the United States – and, should it federate, the European Union and, in the long run, India – compete for global influence at the expense of everyone else. The post-Covid world will be a far more tumultuous one.

A second way that the post-Covid world will mark a return to history is that China and, in the long run, India, will return to the apex of the global economic system. For thousands of years before the Industrial Revolution, the Indian and Chinese economies traded blows as the richest polities on earth. The returns of the Chinese dragon and Indian elephant therefore represent a return to the historical equilibrium position and away from the disequilibrium of the past 200 years.  

Without knowing which foreign policy strategy South Africa will adopt to steer its way through this tumultuous future, it is unclear what any of this means for South Africa.

There are those who argue that South Africa should cling to the post-World War II international system and thereby position itself as an ally of the United States. But this line of reasoning ignores both the remarkable return of China and the equally remarkable retreat of the United States.

Though the much-maligned “United States of Africa” is, for the time being, a complete non-starter politically, further integration and co-operation is, somewhat paradoxically, a sine qua non for the survival of sovereign autonomy.

What is clear is that any future foreign policy strategy ignores China at its peril. Equally clear, however, is that in pursuing Chinese favour, South Africa should not abandon the United States. An optimal foreign policy strategy, therefore, is one that chooses not to choose between the two.

One way to do this is to leverage South Africa’s as-yet underutilised position as a potential deal broker in Africa. Our strategic strength, if any, lies in our relative economic power within the African continent. An optimal foreign policy strategy, then, is one that shifts priorities not to the United States or China but one that focuses on Africa. By leveraging our relative economic might we can curry favour and influence with a region of the world wherein we have both strategic – because geographic – advantage, and yet have hitherto left thoughtlessly abandoned. And since Africa is set to be a key geopolitical battleground between the new behemoths, any political leverage within Africa is sure to be subject to a geopolitical multiplier effect.

So much for the theory. What, practically, does this mean South Africa’s foreign policy establishment should seek to do? For one, accept – and push for – greater economic and political integration within Africa. Though the much-maligned “United States of Africa” is, for the time being, a complete non-starter politically, further integration and co-operation is, somewhat paradoxically, a sine qua non for the survival of sovereign autonomy.

This is because of a third way in which the return of history will instantiate itself: the reassertion of the logic of scale economies in (threats of) violence. Scale economies in violence is the process whereby a single-unit increase in military power results in a larger-than-single-unit increase in the relative strength of military power. Since larger polities can sustain larger armies, scale economies in violence has historically led to a nigh-inexorable increase in the size of polities.

Put simply, scale economies in violence means that one should become a big fish, lest one be eaten by the sharks. DM