Yes, there will be elections, but will there be a political party to vote for, one that is truly credible and trustworthy? The is the question on many South Africans’ minds, judging among others from undecided factors in public opinion polls, and from criticism of all political parties in public narratives.

The African National Congress is suffering lessened public credibility. Is it the old or the new ANC that will be nudging the electorate into the ballot box precincts? It is the new one, judged by post-Nasrec outer appearances, but is it a party courageous enough to axe ministers and officials of disrepute? Is the contemporary ANC, as an alliance of factions (in a compromised unity party), a political suicide bomb that is set to be detonated at the 2019 ballot box? Or, can the Democratic Alliance stay on track in the wake of the Patricia de Lille blow-up? Was the extraction of the Independent Democrats remnants a mere historical hiccup? Or, is there an Economic Freedom Fighters, now that the party has lost its moral high ground in the brawl of the VBS benefits brigade?

Thus, has South Africa’s revered multiparty democracy lost its mojo, now that the major political parties have weakened reputations and lessened gravitas with the voters?

The avalanche of new political parties that have registered with the Electoral Commission, or have threatened to register, does not promise to be the saviour of multiparty politics either. The new generation of parties are veiled in obscurity and some do not move beyond the threat to become a political party. For example, who exactly is the Mazibuye National Congress, and what is its link to the African Transformation Congress, and the already registered African Transformation Movement? From Limpopo we have heard that the Baroka Swaranang Movement, driven by chiefs who have lost faith in the ANC due to the VBS fiasco, is on the verge of joining the ranks of 500 or so political parties in South Africa (some defunct by now).

Despite these party-political ambiguities South Africans will vote in large numbers come April 2019, even if it means voting for virtual political parties, which at best breathe some of the forms and sounds that political parties make. And there is an uncanny match between these not quite political parties and, in crucial respects, the non-government that “rules” in South Africa and is likely to rule post-election.

Consider the “government of the day” in South Africa … Across South Africa there are alternative forms of political participation. “Protest and burn” is a repertoire to beckon representatives to take care of communities in need of government attention. Elected representatives, at whichever level of government, are not experienced as reliable in representing constituents. Government listening to the needs of the people cannot be taken for granted.

There are, equally, many parallel forms of non-state public policy-making. The prerequisite was an ANC Nasrec policy decision on land, for example. Land-hungry (and sometimes politically instigated) communities did not wait for the ANC in government to give formal effect to a new policy of expropriation without compensation. Across urban communities there was the whisper of the new policy direction. From then on multiple communities voted with tape to demarcate proceeds from the new policy. De facto policy was made; government is still trying to catch up with the feet on the ground.

In the same vein there is alternative, non-government service delivery – to match the non-party elections. For example, electricity supply to many areas is practically free to the poor and those brave enough to do unauthorised, informal connections. Pirate water connections are commonplace too. In the absence of formal government services, the refuse removal system in many areas is to pile it up on the street corner.

The list of alternative governance and policymaking is long. Law and order is virtually no-existent. Often, the criminal underworld and its gangs rule. Citizens look after themselves or lose out. Government increasingly “acknowledges” that it can simply not do it all, not even manage state-owned enterprises without help from the private sector (and capturers lift their ears). Both state capacity and state budgets are the problems.

And, right up the stream of the anti-white minority capitalists: are all policy and ideological decisions not taken anyway by those who hold “the real power”? Or, on the other side of the coin and just as real: is the tenderpreneur treadmill so vibrant that deals are brokered that bear no relation to the quality of services to be delivered?

In government itself some ministers do government by running small empires through contingents of consultants and subversive official appointments in charge of decisions, and do all but act concertedly in the public interest. Health and education services in the public sector are frequently not fit for purpose; citizens pay for private alternatives or suffer the consequences.

If this is government, could South Africans pretend that, upon casting their ballots, they would actually be electing a government – a group of people to make policy, implement public decisions, and be available for accountability time?

This is the big challenge on which South Africa’s political parties will be facing off with the electorate in the run-up to Election 2019. The situations depicted in this analysis are not wall-to-wall truths of political parties and government. Yet these problems are pervasive, and just as they have been impacting on public services and citizens’ human rights and quality of life, they have adverse implications for the reputation of South Africa’s multiparty democracy.

Elections are hollow when the contesting parties have little to offer in ethics, credibility and guaranteed delivery, and the resulting government cannot, credibly, promise that it will make a difference – and do so without passing the buck, overwhelmingly, back to citizens. DM