Considering aggregated household survey data over the past twenty years paints an impressive picture. The number of formal dwellings increased from 5.8 to 11.3 million; household access to electricity increased dramatically from 4.4 million to 12.4 million and the number of households with piped water increased from 5 to 10.6 million over the 1993-2011 period. This was the result of a number of well-targeted state programmes that had the effect of reducing asset poverty and asset inequality in post-Apartheid South Africa. An example of this was the introduction of the Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff in 2002, which provides 50 kW of free electricity to all households, attending to the basic electrical needs of a household such as lighting and cooking. ??In terms of water services, in 1994 a free basic water and sanitation services policy was also introduced by the new government, specifically targeting poorer households.

Interrogating the data on a less aggregated basis however, brings into context the disparity of service delivery in more rural provinces such as the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Kwa-Zulu Natal. Census data shows that in 2011, just 50 percent of households in the Eastern Cape had access to piped water, 28 percent had access to water in their yard and a significant 22 percent of household had no access to water on their property. In Limpopo and Kwa-Zulu Natal, 14 percent of households had no access to water on their property. Households in rural areas of Eastern Cape are still using sources of fuel other than electricity for cooking (38 percent) and heating (69 percent). Similar patterns are found in Limpopo and rural areas of Kwa-Zulu Natal. Whilst the service deficit was far larger in these provinces in 1993 than it is today, the fact that there are households that don’t have access to basic services, begs the question as to whether the improvements over the last twenty years are large enough.

Service delivery occurred at a faster rate in the first half of democracy than the second. In part, this is because the backlog in urban areas was far easier to attend to than rural areas. In addition, governance and accountability in local government away from urban centers has not been appropriate to address the needs of these communities. Services received were often interrupted and of a lesser quality. The persistent and increasingly violent protests in Bekkersdal, Mothutlung and Sebokeng are evidence of exasperated and restless communities no longer willing to take a back seat on these issues. Municipal corruption and financial mismanagement has left a number of households in rural areas as well informal settlements without access to quality services. The 2012 local government audit results were telling in that just 18 percent of 278 municipalities got clean results. The rest reported poor quality financials, wasteful and irregular expenditure amongst other ills. Not only has this resulted in a poor standard of living but also contributed to a higher cost of living whereby billing and regulation was improperly implemented. Stats SA reported that low-income households still spend around 20 percent of domestic income on utilities, despite the free allocations.

The real issue is therefore not whether things are better now, but whether the improvements made could have been greater and more equitable. This is not a question that can be answered definitively or by looking at socio-economic data. This requires an assessment of weak institutions, governance constraints and priorities of state spending. South Africa’s democracy has been tarnished by maladministration, the squandering of public funds by government officials and tender irregularities. An analysis comparing the inefficiencies created by bad service delivery through corruption and rent seeking against the counterfactual of efficient service delivery would be useful to measure progress. Establishing the counterfactual, albeit a truly difficult task, would lead to an interesting dialogue around the actual cost of service delivery for various communities. It would also allow us to take account of the misused funds and where they could have been directed.

It is therefore simplistic to consider progress in terms of what has been done, without a careful eye on what has not been achieved and for whom. For example, could the quality and quantity of RDP houses have been greater if not for tender irregularities and pocketing of funds set aside? In terms of electricity, has the rising price of electricity constrained its use by poor households who also bare the brunt of load shedding to a greater extent? Is it acceptable that households in rural areas of Kwa-Zulu Natal have to fetch water from a tap miles away, whilst others closer to urban areas experience water shortages on a regular basis? These are the real questions that need to be answered and assessed when we measure asset and service delivery progress.

When government becomes accountable to poor communities for the delivery of basic services, not just in terms of quantity but quality too, service delivery in South Africa should be celebrated. However hopeful, this is indeed a useful notion to embark on the next twenty years. DM