---
title: "‘Is the deal dead?’ Your questions on the Iran-US conflict answered"
description: "The US and Iran continue to be in an acrimonious dispute over the recently signed memorandum of understanding, with both countries resuming strikes. We answer your questions."
type: "NewsArticle"
publisher: "Daily Maverick"
site: "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za"
section: "WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST"
author: "J Brooks Spector"
author_url: "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/author/jbrooksspector/"
canonical_url: "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-07-16-is-the-deal-dead-your-questions-on-the-iran-us-conflict-answered/"
published: "2026-07-16T22:20:13"
lang: "en-ZA"
word_count: 2188
---

# ‘Is the deal dead?’ Your questions on the Iran-US conflict answered

> The US and Iran continue to be in an acrimonious dispute over the recently signed memorandum of understanding, with both countries resuming strikes. We answer your questions.

By J Brooks Spector · Published 17 July 2026, 00:20 SAST

## Key points
- ‘The US and Iran are embroiled in escalating hostilities over a recently signed memorandum of understanding, which both sides now appear to view as ineffective.
- Iran's attacks on ships and US military installations have raised concerns about the stability of the vital Strait of Hormuz, with both nations implementing blockades and threats.
- The future of US-Iran relations remains uncertain, with questions regarding military actions, nuclear ambitions, and the involvement of regional players like Israel clouding prospects for peace.
- As the conflict deepens, implications for global energy costs and regional security continue to fuel debates around negotiations and the potential for long-term solutions.

## Content

Once again, hostilities have ratcheted up dangerously in the Persian Gulf. There is [a new cycle](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9323zgq6wvo) of Iranian attacks on ships, followed by attacks on Iranian military facilities, then further attacks on US military facilities in Persian Gulf nations, and now US threats of attacks on Iranian civilian infrastructure.

For the world, there is the question of whether the Strait of Hormuz is actually open to unimpeded commercial traffic or is closed in whole or in part by blockades or the chances of drone attacks. The Iranians are [reportedly now charging tolls](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/918467/iran-confirms-strait-of-hormuz-tolls-now-operational-charging-up-to-2-million-per-vessel#:~:text=The%20confirmation%20that%20the%20toll%20system%20has,%241.5%20million%20and%20%242%20million%20per%20transit.) on ships transiting the Strait. And the US has again [declared a blockade of Iranian vessels](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/15/us/politics/us-blockade-iran.html) in the Gulf and Strait.

The US and Iran continue to be in an acrimonious dispute over the recently signed memorandum of understanding (MOU), any way forward for the agreement, what will be included in future negotiations, and if any potential agreement mandates solutions to nearby conflicts in the region.

If the US president believes what he has said most recently, that the MOU is now dead by virtue of the intransigent behaviour of Iranian negotiators and the drone attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz, then we are in for a perilous future.

![Brooks-Readers Questions](https://cdn.dailymaverick.co.za/i/8_NjqdJFCGe7bGzPxAWRt_rxw50=/200x100/smart/filters:strip_exif\(\)/file/attachments/orphans/GettyImages-2253959928_641425.jpg)

*US President Donald Trump welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to his Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, on 29 December 2025. (Photo: Joe Raedle / Getty Images)*

Consequently, three paths lie ahead: the conflict will drag on in its current state, escalate into a far more destructive war, or freeze into a stalemate akin to that of the Korean Peninsula. Whichever path unfolds, genuine peace remains on a distant horizon.

Here we respond to queries from readers. Given the fluid current situation — such as an Iranian intention to control an international waterway or the US counter of a blockade of Iranian-flagged ships, and an on-again-off-again US proposal to collect tolls for ships transiting the Hormuz Strait — future developments may elicit additional questions.

### **Your questions**

**Are the terms the same or worse than the Obama deal? If the deal is even slightly better, what demands can European countries like France make, having settled for worse before?**

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a detailed technical agreement reached in 2015 following many months of negotiations, designed to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. With the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, it has ceased operation.

The provisions of the [JCPOA](https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf) limited Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities and stockpiles, and established extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the programme remained exclusively peaceful. In return, global powers agreed to lift UN, EU and US economic sanctions against Iran. It was not designed to restrict Iranian missile developments or to achieve peace arrangements elsewhere in the Middle East.

The [MOU](https://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/memo/0001/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-us-and-iran.pdf) was a less technically detailed agreement, effectively a notional plan calling for a ceasefire, further negotiations over difficult issues, such as Iranian funds held in escrow in the US, creation of a reconstruction fund, management of the Strait of Hormuz, and steps towards a peaceful settlement in Lebanon.

**Is the deal to open the Strait of Hormuz now dead again?**

So far, the MOU has not achieved significant results vis-à-vis the Iran/US confrontation. The most recent statement from Trump is that the deal is “off”. However, there is an agreement between Israel and Lebanon aimed at a ceasefire in Lebanon, although Hezbollah is not prepared, so far, to participate in it, even though this has been the crux of the problem for the two nations.

**Why did Iran only retaliate against Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, and not Saudi Arabia, UAE or Qatar, even though it says the strikes came from those three countries? Is there a deeper strategic reason?**

In fact, Iran has fired missiles and drones at targets in the other nations named, primarily but not solely targeting US military facilities. Some Iranian missiles have struck civilian buildings in urban areas in those nations.

![Brooks-Readers Questions](https://cdn.dailymaverick.co.za/i/WQDz2HpO55HjR9fy8kGzLJTF_l0=/200x100/smart/filters:strip_exif\(\)/file/attachments/orphans/GettyImages-2286097837_773242.jpg)

*A poster of Trump is held by mourners as they pay their respects to the late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, at the Imam Khomeini Grand Mosque in Tehran, Iran, on 14 July. (Photo: Majid Saeedi / Getty Images)*

**Does BRICS profit from Iran’s apparent victory over the US?**

That would depend on how one defines “profit”. For China and India, heavily dependent on petro-energy imports from the Middle East, the closure of the strait raises their energy costs.

For Russia, however, a rise in oil and natural gas prices on sales to places where it can sell oil outside current sanctions against it may be beneficial. It’s likely that US actions have shifted its influence downward on many other global issues.

**What gave the US the right to bomb Iran? Was the nuclear justification a pretext, as with Iraq?**

Numerous US presidents and other foreign leaders have consistently expressed the view that Iran should not achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

This is in response to efforts by Iran to proceed towards uranium enrichment towards weapons-grade levels, beyond levels for energy generation. Given Iran’s support for violent non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas, there have been ongoing concerns in the West that a nuclear-capable Iran could deeply destabilise the precarious power balance in the region and encourage further nuclear proliferation by others.

Further, given Iran’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it remains unclear why it was continuing enrichment efforts. These reasons supported the international effort to achieve the JCPOA. However, the Trump administration made the highly problematic choice to abrogate participation in the JCPOA and then subsequently carried out two major aerial campaigns against Iranian military facilities, its leadership, and, now, increasingly, infrastructure.

Most reports indicate that Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities, while significantly suppressed by those attacks, have [not been eliminated](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-intelligence-indicates-limited-new-damage-irans-nuclear-program-sources-say-2026-05-04/). Iran may at some point elect to resume enrichment efforts, and that might fuel further future conflicts.

**Why should Iran — or any country — negotiate with the US about how it runs its own affairs? Isn’t “preventing nuclear weapons” an excuse for regime change?**

While the prevention of Iranian nuclear weapons development has been stressed by many US presidents as well as the leaders of other nations, it is also true that before the immediate hostilities the US had [advocated regime change](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8egwywkkd1o) and supported killing a significant number of Iran’s top leadership by a joint US/Israeli mission.

Further, just before the newest round of conflict, the US had [argued strongly](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q4z33pnnyo) against the brutal suppression of Iranian dissidents and protesters, although that issue has largely vanished in US government statements.

Presumably, Iran’s leadership believes it is also in its interest to negotiate — most especially to gain global support, prestige and credibility; to recover access to the [very large pool of funds](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/15/what-are-irans-100bn-in-frozen-assets-and-where-are-they-held) now held in escrow; and to secure desperately needed foreign investment.

There is also a realisation Iran has achieved a significant strategic advantage from the discovery of its ability to choke off the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and Hormuz Strait, virtually at will.

**With Israel being a role-player, what share of the deal did it contribute? What ultimatum is it putting forward to stop attacks?**

While Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has strongly lobbied for years that the West must take definitive action against Iran’s presumed nuclear ambitions, recent reports indicate the US president ultimately went “with his gut” in ordering the launch of attacks, even if many of his senior advisers strongly demurred.

Ultimately, the power (and military resources) asymmetry between the US and Israel will mean that if an actual agreement between Iran and the US comes to be, the Israelis will effectively be forced to go along with it. This would be reinforced if any agreement included sharp reductions of Iranian support for Hezbollah.

![Photo Essay-In Pictures18](https://cdn.dailymaverick.co.za/i/BsOxVw0_3KeY0fDZDi983Pujug8=/200x100/smart/filters:strip_exif\(\)/file/attachments/orphans/RC2JCLARXVF8_682312.jpg)

*Resident Naama Srour looks through the rubble at the site of an Israeli strike that killed multiple people in Deir Qanoun al-Nahr, Lebanon, on 20 May. (Photo: Stringer / Reuters)*

**Why isn’t Iran held liable for further Hezbollah strikes and aggression from Lebanon against Israel in the agreement? Or for its total withdrawal from Lebanon, given that it finances Hezbollah?**

In the real world, it will be very difficult to enforce a total break between Iran and those non-state actors, given the centrality of such support in Iran’s strategic outlook. One goal of the MOU was supposed to tamp down that support, although enforcing that remains hypothetical.

**Why did the US start this conflict? What did it gain, given the losses of global trust, lives, weapons and taxpayer money?**

Assuming we accept the statement at face value that the US started the conflict, rather than it being just the latest element of a conflict with roots reaching back decades, the reader is, of course, asking the same questions being asked by a growing majority of US citizens.

One possible answer is that Donald Trump, seduced by his easy success with Venezuela, believed the military imbalance between Iran and the US would generate a quick win, leading to a fall in the Iranian leadership, and a more malleable regime taking its place. And all of it would be wrapped up before the upcoming US mid-term elections, thus becoming an element in the Trump legacy. It has not, obviously, turned out that way.

![Photo Essay-InPictures17](https://cdn.dailymaverick.co.za/i/Bynw0XZEa41gr9-2-UNoA7CAM0A=/200x100/smart/filters:strip_exif\(\)/file/attachments/orphans/GettyImages-2275855124_767951.jpg)

*Donald Trump may have believed the US was set for an easy victory in Iran. (Photo: Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)*

**The CIA and IAEA have reportedly found no indication Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions. Where is the panic coming from — is it a bogeyman to justify the war?**

The core issue is not whether Iran is planning to move immediately towards the actual creation of a nuclear capability, but rather, if it has chosen a path that could put it on a trajectory towards being able to do so, should it choose to do so.

That helps explain the concern over its continuing efforts to enrich uranium beyond the levels appropriate for peaceful energy generation. The fundamental difficulty comes in evaluating capabilities or intentions — and both are very hard to evaluate in such fraught, secretive circumstances.

**The US has been trying to control Iran since the 1950s. How can this new peace process overcome such deep-seated distrust?**

In fact, the two nations have had periods both of deep distrust as well as a quarter of a century of close cooperation during the era of Shah Pahlavi.

However, the distrust is mutual. (One must remember the [violent hostage-taking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis) of dozens of US diplomats in Tehran in 1979-80.) In reality, negotiations between antagonists are always harder than between partners, but those are much more important, given the stakes and possible consequences.

![State funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](https://cdn.dailymaverick.co.za/i/CJqJhmwqQYbhW5DKQq0f5JQnDl4=/200x100/smart/filters:strip_exif\(\)/file/attachments/2994/14132063_433983.jpg)

*Iranians take part in the funeral ceremony of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Qom, Iran, on 7 July. (Photo: Office of the Supreme Leader)*

**When will Americans realise their president is an egotistic megalomaniac hell-bent on becoming a dictator?**

While the reader’s sentiments are understandable, his conclusion is not as clear-cut as he might like to believe. Institutions like the courts, the media and some members of the national legislature are increasingly pushing back on many fronts over the excesses of the incumbent president.

Most important will be how the November midterm election turns out. Will Democrats gain majorities in either or both houses of Congress, ensuring more pressure on the incumbent president?

**How will the deal lead to short-term relief for the average South African?**

The most obvious impact would be on the price of fuel and the cost of living more generally, easing upward pressures on the costs of goods and services linked to energy. A settlement could generate more stability in the price of energy, easing speculation on price fluctuations.

**If non-Muslim people are considered inferior in Islam, why would Iran keep to any negotiated settlement? Can they not simply lie and walk away?**

The simple answer is that religion is not the only motivation driving the Iranian government, despite its theocratic nature and regardless of any real or imagined tenets within that state religion. National self-protection, an opportunity to restore the country’s economy, and a way to gain international prestige are also important motivators.

**Why is Israel allowed to bomb neighbouring countries without consequences? Is it time the West — which colonised the world and now bullies through the US —is held to account?**

Israel has asserted its right to pro-active self-protection from violent non-state actors, as well as potential threats from a nuclear-capable Iran.

Israel has been subjected to numerous missile and drone attacks in recent years, and that has conditioned its leadership to prioritise military solutions to what are ultimately strategic and political challenges. Whether its response in this case was proportionate or not will demand serious analysis and debate.

What is clear, however, is that Israel has suffered a major decline in support globally, and, most ominously, within the US. Israeli leaders may not have anticipated such consequences (or ignored them) in their eagerness to join in the aerial attacks on Iran to achieve what they believed would be a strategic victory. **DM**