Baboon-proof logic: Why a Simon’s Town fence is better than removing the Waterfall, Seaforth troops

I am writing this to explain clearly why I oppose the current plan to remove the Waterfall and Seaforth baboon troops from Simon’s Town before implementing a targeted baboon-proof fence along the urban edge.

My position is not that baboons should be allowed to remain in town. They should not. Nor is my position that residents must simply tolerate ongoing damage, fear, waste raids or conflict. They should not. My position is:

The City of Cape Town, SANParks and CapeNature should not permanently remove the Waterfall and Seaforth troops while a credible, targeted, privately funded fence option is available and has not been properly attempted.

The fence is the only option currently on the table that could simultaneously protect residents, protect baboons, reduce conflict, preserve free-ranging troops and avoid the reputational damage of removing whole troops from the South Peninsula.

The removal plan is being justified using arguments that I believe are weak, selective and in some cases misleading. Below I set out my rebuttal point by point.

The South Peninsula population is not in the middle of an uncontrolled boom

One of the central problems with the public framing of the baboon issue is that numbers for the whole Cape Peninsula are used to create the impression that the entire population is increasing in a way that justifies removals. That is misleading.

The North and South Peninsula are effectively different management problems. The northern population has increased substantially. The southern population has not increased in the same way. Using the Joint Task Team’s own accepted numbers:

• South Peninsula baboons in December 2025: 334;
• South Peninsula baboons in January 1998: 270;
• Net increase over roughly 27 years: 64 baboons.

That is an increase of only about 2.4 baboons per year across the whole South Peninsula. This is not evidence of a runaway southern population. Now consider what happens if the Waterfall and Seaforth troops are removed:

• Waterfall troop: 44 baboons;
• Seaforth troop: 16 baboons;
• Total proposed removal: 60 baboons;
• South Peninsula remaining after removal: 274 baboons.

That would leave the South Peninsula with only four more baboons than in 1998, when the population was still recovering from historical capture, culling and chronic human-caused mortality.

This is the central demographic fact that should be driving the debate. After more than 25 years of management, monitoring, public spending and conservation effort, the proposed removal would take the South Peninsula almost back to where it started. That cannot honestly be presented as a measured response to a population surplus.

Whole-Peninsula population figures are being used to justify southern removals

The Cape Peninsula baboon population is often discussed as if it is one uniform population moving in one direction. It is not. The northern increase is real (from 100 in 1998 to 271 in December 2025). But it should not be used to justify removing southern troops when the southern population has remained comparatively stable.

This matters because the proposed removal of Waterfall and Seaforth is not a minor adjustment. It is the removal of entire troops from the South Peninsula. If those removals are justified to the public using whole-Peninsula population growth, then the public is not being given the most relevant demographic picture.

For more context

Simon’s Town is about to lose its baboons, a brave funder can save them

December 4, 2025

The relevant question is not: Has the total Peninsula population increased? The relevant question is: What happens to the South Peninsula population if these two troops are removed? The answer is stark: it falls back to almost the same number recorded nearly three decades ago. That is why I regard the current framing as deeply problematic. It creates the appearance of a broad population-control necessity while obscuring the specific consequence for the South Peninsula.

The same mistake is being repeated under a more acceptable name

When we first began working on the Peninsula baboon issue, the population had been depleted by capture and culling of whole troops and was struggling to replace its numbers because of human-caused mortality. Now, decades later, we are again facing a proposal to remove whole troops. The language has changed. Instead of “culling” or “problem-animal removal”, we now speak of “sanctuary” and “welfare”. But the ecological outcome is still the same: free-ranging troops are removed from the landscape.

I accept that a sanctuary may be preferable to shooting animals. But we should not pretend that sanctuary is the same as conservation in the wild. For a free-ranging baboon troop, sanctuary is permanent confinement. It may be more humane than lethal control, but it is still the removal of wild animals from the ecosystem. That level of intervention should only be considered after the most obvious non-lethal alternative has been properly attempted. In Simon’s Town, that alternative is a fence.

The habituation argument is being overused

The Waterfall and Seaforth troops are being described as if they are uniquely habituated or somehow beyond ecological redemption. I do not accept this framing.

Twenty-five years ago, before the current management system existed, troops such as Da Gama and Slangkop were already spending extraordinary amounts of time in residential areas. We recorded troops spending up to 94% of days in residential areas. Baboons were already opening doors, raiding houses, entering kitchens, stealing food and behaving in ways that residents found intolerable. In other words, the behaviours now being used to justify removal are not new. They are not unique to Waterfall and Seaforth. They are what happens when baboons have repeated access to human food and urban rewards.

If we had treated habituation as proof that a troop was beyond saving 25 years ago, there would be very few baboons left on the Peninsula today. Habituation is not a moral failing by baboons. It is a management failure by people. The correct response is not to remove the troop. The correct response is to remove the reward, close the urban access points and hold the boundary. That is exactly what a fence is designed to do.

The current plan does not solve the underlying problem

Removing Waterfall and Seaforth may remove the immediate animals causing conflict, but it does not solve the underlying urban-edge problem. Simon’s Town will still have:

• Unsecured urban food sources;
• Bins, restaurants, houses and waste areas;
• An attractive low-lying urban edge;
• Residents with sharply divided views;
• A long history of baboon access; and
• Neighbouring troops capable of moving into newly available space.

If Waterfall and Seaforth are removed without a durable exclusion system, the same urban niche remains open. Another troop, splinter group or dispersing individuals may eventually discover the same resources. Then the authorities will face the same problem again, having lost public trust and removed two free-ranging troops in the process.

A fence addresses the cause. Removal addresses the symptom.

A funded fence changes the ethical and practical calculation

This is not a situation where the authorities are being asked to choose between an unaffordable dream and an unpleasant necessity. A funder was found for a targeted Simon’s Town fence. That should have changed the entire discussion.

Instead of welcoming the opportunity to test a privately funded, non-lethal solution, the response was to burden the proposal with requirements that went far beyond a targeted urban-edge intervention. The funder was effectively expected not only to fund the fence, but also to carry the risk of community negotiations, environmental approvals, possible failure, continued monitoring, expanded alignments, and even sanctuary implications. That is not a reasonable way to treat a good-faith conservation offer. A donor willing to fund the capital cost of a fence is offering to remove a large part of the financial risk from the authorities. The correct institutional response should be: let us test this properly, define success criteria, support approvals and see whether this can solve the problem. Instead, the proposal appears to have been judged against an inflated and expanded version of itself.

The City’s fence-cost argument depends on an over-expanded fence alignment

One of the arguments against the Simon’s Town fence is cost. But that cost is inflated if the fence is made to include areas that are not central to the conflict problem.

A targeted fence should focus on the Simon’s Town urban boundary where the conflict occurs. It should not be required to fence every military, remote, sparsely inhabited or marginal area that baboons have ever accessed. The practical principle should be simple: Fence the hard urban edge where conflict is concentrated. That is where the greatest benefit per metre of fence lies.

If the cost calculation includes the naval base, the South African Naval Ammunition Depot, remote private properties and additional low-conflict areas, then the proposal is being made artificially expensive. It is being judged not as a targeted conflict-reduction intervention, but as if it must enclose every possible future access point across the broader landscape. No practical wildlife-management intervention should be assessed that way.

The correct comparison is not “cost per baboon”. That is a crude and misleading metric. The correct comparisons are:

• Cost per conflict incident avoided;
• Cost per year of reduced urban management pressure;
• Cost compared with long-term sanctuary care;
• Cost compared with continued ranger deployment without a fence;
• Cost compared with litigation, public conflict and reputational damage; and
• Cost compared with the ecological loss of removing whole troops.

On those terms, a targeted fence is a serious and rational investment.

The argument that the terrain is too difficult is not convincing

It has been suggested that the Simon’s Town terrain makes fencing impractical. I do not accept this.

The proposed alignment largely follows an existing contour/firebreak line. There are difficult sections, but difficulty is not the same as impossibility. The problematic sections are limited and can be engineered. This is not a proposal to fence an entire mountain range. It is a targeted fence along a known urban edge. Fences are built in far more difficult terrain in conservation and agriculture all the time. The real question is not whether every metre is easy. It is whether the difficult sections can be solved with appropriate design, materials, labour and maintenance. They can.

The fear that Waterfall will move to Dido Valley or Harbour Bay is speculative

One of the main arguments against the fence is that if Waterfall is excluded from Simon’s Town it may shift to Dido Valley, Harbour Bay, Glencairn or other resource-rich areas. That is a risk. It should be acknowledged. But it is not a reason to reject the fence before trying it.

There is not strong evidence that this outcome is inevitable. When Waterfall has been pushed out of town before, the troop has used the mountain areas above Simon’s Town, including Admirals Kloof and Klawer Valley. Seaforth, when excluded, tends to move upslope and southwards.

No management option is risk-free. Removal also carries risks: reputational damage, legal challenges, loss of public support, welfare concerns and the possibility that another troop eventually fills the same urban niche. The rational response to movement risk is adaptive management:

• Collar key animals if necessary;
• Staff the northern and southern fence ends;
• Monitor movement carefully;
• Respond quickly if the troop begins shifting into new conflict areas; and
• Strengthen waste control and ranger presence where needed.

Rejecting a funded fence because of a possible future movement pattern is not good adaptive management. It is a way of avoiding the only non-lethal option that could actually solve the Simon’s Town urban-edge problem.

The claim that Waterfall ‘should never have been there’ is historically and ecologically weak

There is an argument that the Waterfall troop should never have been allowed to establish itself and that the problem exists because the authorities failed to remove the original breakaway animals years ago. That argument is both ethically and historically troubling.

Baboons have long used the Simon’s Town mountain landscape, including Admirals Kloof, historically Baviaanskloof. Historical records and local memory indicate that baboons were not alien to this area. The Peninsula ecosystem evolved with baboons moving through it, dispersing seeds, transporting nutrients and using both high and low areas. To say that Waterfall “should never have been there” simplifies a much longer ecological history into a management convenience.

Even if one accepts that the troop’s modern formation created management problems, that does not mean the only legitimate answer now is permanent removal. It means the urban boundary should have been secured earlier. That is precisely why the fence matters.

The ‘not enough natural food’ argument confuses preference with necessity

Another argument is that if Waterfall and Seaforth are fenced out of Simon’s Town there will not be enough food for them and they will be forced into other human areas. This confuses preference with necessity.

Baboons prefer low-lying, nutrient-rich areas where available. They also prefer human food because it is calorie-rich and easy to obtain. That does not mean they cannot survive without town.

Chacma baboons survive across highly variable environments, including much harsher and drier habitats than the Cape Peninsula. Historically, baboons occurred across the Peninsula from low to high elevations. The fact that baboons prefer urban food does not make urban food ecologically necessary. The correct welfare question is not whether a town provides easy food. Of course it does. The correct question is whether baboons can live as wild baboons on the mountain side of a fence, without the constant dangers of town. The answer is yes.

A fence would benefit residents, baboons and the authorities

The strongest argument for the fence is that it is the only option that can produce a genuine win across all sides. For residents who are tired of baboon incursions, the benefits are obvious:

• Fewer baboons in houses;
• Less property damage;
• Less fear for children, elderly people and pets;
• Fewer daily confrontations; and
• Less need to live with permanently locked windows and doors.

For baboon supporters and conservationists, the benefits are equally obvious:

• Waterfall and Seaforth remain free-ranging;
• Urban injuries and deaths decline;
• Pellet gun shootings, poisoning, dog attacks and vehicle strikes are reduced;
• The troops continue to use their mountain home range; and
• The ecological integrity of the South Peninsula is better preserved.

For the authorities, the benefits are strategic:

• They can show they tried a serious non-lethal intervention;
• They reduce conflict without immediately resorting to removal;
• They avoid the public perception that the outcome was predetermined;
• They create a replicable model for future baboon-proof fencing; and
• If the fence works, they receive the credit for a conservation success.

This is why I find the current approach so difficult to understand. The fence is not merely a technical intervention. It is a way out of a decades-long conflict narrative.

The proposed fence does not remove the need for rangers – it makes ranger work achievable

It is true that a fence will still need rangers or monitors. But this is not an argument against fencing.

Without a fence, rangers must attempt to manage baboon movement across a long, porous urban edge. They are permanently reacting to incursions, complaints, raids, gates, waste, houses and conflict. With a fence, the task changes. Rangers can focus on:

• The northern and southern endpoints;
• Gates;
• Breach points;
• Maintenance checks;
• Rapid response to attempted crossings; and
• Monitoring troop movements outside the urban area.

That is a completely different operational challenge. It is smaller, more defined and more realistic. A fence does not replace management. It makes management possible.

The current plan risks losing public trust

The baboon programme cannot succeed without legitimacy. Removing Waterfall and Seaforth before attempting a funded fence will deepen the belief that authorities are not genuinely committed to non-lethal solutions. It will reinforce the view that “problem” troops are simply removed when pressure becomes too great. That is dangerous for the entire programme.

Public trust is not a soft issue. It determines whether residents cooperate, whether donors contribute, whether conservationists support difficult decisions, and whether legal challenges derail implementation. A fence-first approach builds trust because it says: “We will try the serious non-lethal option before we remove wild troops.” A removal-first approach says: “We will remove the troops, and perhaps deal with the structural problem later.” That is the wrong sequence.

The authorities are facing a choice between solving the problem and removing the evidence of the problem

The Waterfall and Seaforth troops are not the root problem. They are the visible expression of the root problem. The root problem is an open urban edge with food rewards, weak waste control, divided residents and no defensible boundary. Removing the troops may reduce the immediate visibility of the problem, but it does not fix the system that produced the conflict. A fence would.

That is why I believe the current plan has the sequence wrong. The authorities should first build the boundary, control the attractants, staff the weak points and then assess whether the troops can remain free-ranging. Only if that fails should permanent removal be considered.

My position in one sentence: I oppose the removal of Waterfall and Seaforth because the South Peninsula numbers do not justify it, the habituation argument is overstated, the whole-Peninsula framing is misleading, the underlying urban-edge problem will remain unresolved, and a credible funded fence has not been properly attempted.

Conclusion: Build the fence before removing the troops

The City, SANParks and CapeNature still have an opportunity to turn the Simon’s Town baboon conflict into a conservation success. They can support a targeted, funded, baboon-proof fence along the urban edge. They can employ a small local ranger team to manage the endpoints. They can improve waste control. They can monitor the response of the troops. They can show residents and conservationists that non-lethal management is being seriously attempted before whole troops are removed from the wild.

Or they can continue with removal, leaving many people to conclude that the decision was effectively made before the best alternative was tested.

After 25 years, we should not be back where we started: removing whole troops because a minority of residents are angry and because the authorities have not built the boundary that everyone knows is needed.

The Waterfall and Seaforth troops should be kept out of Simon’s Town. But they should be kept out by a fence, not removed from the landscape. Build the fence. Staff the ends. Control the waste. Monitor the outcome. Then decide. That is the defensible sequence. That is the humane sequence. And it is the only approach that gives residents, baboons and the authorities a realistic chance of success. DM

Dr David Gaynor, a conservation ecologist and primatologist, holds a PhD in baboon foraging ecology and, with Dr Ruth Kansky, authored the first individual-based census and management plan for Cape Peninsula baboons. They developed the first management plan for baboons on the Peninsula, and their two-year trial of monitors on the Slangkop and Da Gama Park troops formed the basis of the monitor programme.