--- title: "US-SA relations among key bilateral tussles to watch as Africa readies for Trump comeback" description: "How will Donald Trump’s second-term policies affect US relations with the continent?" type: "NewsArticle" publisher: "Daily Maverick" site: "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za" section: "ISS TODAY OP-ED" author: "Emmaculate Liaga and Zenge Simakoloyi" author_url: "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/author/emmaculate-liaga-and-zenge-simakoloyi/" canonical_url: "https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2024-12-09-us-sa-among-key-bilateral-ties-to-watch-as-africa-readies-for-trump/" published: "2024-12-09T16:52:06" updated: "2024-12-09T16:52:08" lang: "en-ZA" word_count: 1127 --- # US-SA relations among key bilateral tussles to watch as Africa readies for Trump comeback > How will Donald Trump’s second-term policies affect US relations with the continent? By Emmaculate Liaga and Zenge Simakoloyi · Published 9 December 2024, 18:52 SAST · Updated 9 December 2024, 18:52 SAST ## Key points - How will Donald Trump’s second-term policies affect US relations with the continent? - Biden's Angola visit underscores a renewed US focus on Africa, but Trump's potential return raises questions about future relations. - African nations must proactively shape ties with the US, especially as Trump's policies could shift key bilateral dynamics, particularly with South Africa. - South Africa's neutrality on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and ties with China may strain US relations under Trump, influenced by key figures in his administration. - Kenya's status as a MN-Nato ally could bolster its bargaining power, but the US may prioritize strategic partnerships while maintaining a cautious approach to funding. ## Content President Joe Biden’s recent trip to Angola – the first state visit by a US president in nine years – has highlighted America’s renewed engagement with Africa. But as Donald Trump prepares for his second term in office, questions arise about the future of US-Africa relations, and whether this engagement will continue. Trump’s first term, characterised by an inward-focused “America First” agenda, showed the need for Africa to recalibrate its strategies – particularly in strategic geopolitical and security engagements. Several key issues at bilateral, regional and continental levels will be affected by his second-term policies and the priorities of his inner circle. Trump’s return presents African countries with an opportunity to take a proactive stance in shaping their political and [economic](https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-would-trump-2-0-impact-african-economies) relations with the US and developing resilient strategies instead of reacting to shifting US policies. Key bilateral relationships, particularly between the US and South Africa, are expected to shift – stemming from US opposition to South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel over [Gaza](https://unric.org/en/south-africa-vs-israel-14-other-countries-intend-to-join-the-icj-case/#:~:text=South%20Africa%20filed%20its%20complaint,its%20military%20assault%20on%20Gaza.), and the country’s close ties with China and Russia. **Read more:**[Middle East crisis](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article_tag/middle-east-crisis/) **Read more:**[Israel-Palestine War](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/middle-east-crisis-news-hub/) In particular, South Africa’s neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine war will be a point of tension in a second Trump presidency. The president is also opposed to South Africa’s growing partnership with China, which is amplified by China’s efforts to direct global trade away from the US and BRICS’ attempt at de-dollarisation, a move [criticised](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrwj0p2dd9o) by Trump. **Read more:**[War in Ukraine](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/war-in-ukraine/) **Read more:**[Ukraine Crisis Archives](https://www-dailymaverick-co-za.webpkgcache.com/doc/-/s/www.dailymaverick.co.za/section/ukraine-crisis/) Notable figures in Trump’s camp are also likely to affect US-South Africa relations. For example, Senator Marco Rubio, the presumptive secretary of state and a strong critic of China, condemned South Africa’s decision to downgrade Taiwan’s [embassy](https://x.com/SenMarcoRubio/status/1849514946943402319). Trump’s pick for UN ambassador, Elise Stefanik, was part of a petition condemning South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, calling it an attempt to “[demonise](https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/smith_manning_letter_to_sec._blinken_re._south_africa_claims_against_israel_at_ijc_1.23.24.pdf)” Israel. Michael Waltz led a push to [review](https://issafrica.org/iss-today/pretoria-walks-a-tightrope-on-us-relations) US-South Africa ties, a move Biden resisted, but with Waltz as Trump’s pick for national security adviser, it could gain momentum. South Africa assumed the G20 chair on 1 December and will host the 2025 Johannesburg summit. The country now faces a dual challenge of maintaining neutrality while addressing growing geopolitical divisions – seeking to build consensus among G20 members and an expanded BRICS group while managing a more isolationist US under Trump’s leadership. This also presents an opportunity for Pretoria to spotlight African priorities on the global stage, especially with the African Union (AU), now a full member of the G20. With the US succeeding South Africa as chair, this transition could pave the way for a possible Cyril Ramaphosa-Trump engagement within the year, offering a critical window for dialogue and potential recalibration of relations. In east Africa, Kenya’s newly elevated status as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (MN-Nato) ally could offer Nairobi some bargaining chips in the international space. Despite Trump’s America First policy and negative [views](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/04/02/donald-trump-tells-crowd-hed-be-fine-if-nato-broke-up/) on Nato, he may temper his approach by focusing on strategic bilateral partnerships with MN-Nato allies, such as Kenya. The new US administration will probably continue its security relations in east Africa and the Horn – largely due to Rubio’s visit to Kenya and Somalia in 2019, part of a bipartisan oversight mission for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Furthermore, because of the declining US security influence in west Africa, resulting from successive coups and the subsequent expulsion of US troops from Niger, maintaining the security partnership with Kenya is expected to remain a priority. And given the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti, US-Kenya bilateral engagements might move the needle towards securing commitment to America’s more than $300-million funding pledge to the mission. Although this would be a tall order given the Trump camp’s reluctance to fund the UN, and peacekeeping in particular – despite the US [proposing](https://apnews.com/article/un-haiti-police-peacekeeping-gangs-violence-kenya-3b42115d836e6ff860d64714e1031063) the resolution to replace the Kenyan-led MSS with a UN mission. Trump’s preference is for strategic partners to take up more of the burden without the US overextending its resources – so Kenya must look beyond the US for support. #### **Contentious Horn of Africa** On the regional front, perhaps the most contentious area is the Horn of Africa. The controversial Project 2025 document of proposals produced by the conservative Heritage Foundation chapter on the State Department includes the recognition of Somaliland as a hedge against China’s growing influence in Djibouti. This aligns with former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tibor Nagy, who served in Trump’s first term and advocated for its recognition. Although denied by Trump, Project 2025 is predominantly written by key former Trump officials, including the State Department chapter author, Kiron K Skinner. Supporting this are optimistic [statements](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/trump-somaliland-new-country-gavin-williamson-b2648376.html) of Somaliland recognition from former UK defence secretary Gavin Williamson after discussions with Trump’s policy leads. This could complicate US-Somalia and US-Ethiopia relations, as it will intensify brewing tensions over Ethiopia’s Red Sea access deal with Somaliland, much to the chagrin of Somalia, which has sought alliances with Egypt and Eritrea to counter them. Whether this is followed through will be crucial in determining the success of the AU’s Ethiopia-Somalia [mediation](https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1192-press-statement-en-jan-2024.pdf) efforts. On a continental level, how the US responds to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform proposals will matter to Africa. Current UN ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield has expressed [support](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-supports-two-permanent-un-security-council-seats-africa-2024-09-12/) for Africa securing a permanent seat (albeit without veto) on the UNSC. Will the Trump administration continue this momentum? Given Trump’s first-term attempts at [defunding](https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/26/573483336/trump-administration-touts-a-smaller-u-n-budget-and-takes-credit-for-it) the UN and preference for bilateral over multilateral relations, momentum for UNSC reform in Africa’s favour is unlikely to increase under Trump’s second term. Regardless, Africa must address its internal divisions on how the two seats outlined in the [Ezulwini](https://old.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf) Consensus will be allocated. A more consequential area facing US-Africa relations would be the US’s position and contribution to UNSC [Resolution](https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/420/06/pdf/n2342006.pdf) 2719, a mechanism designed to fund AU-led peace support operations. America is the largest contributor to UN peace support operations, at 27% of the 2023-24 $6.1-billion budget. Within months of Trump’s first term, the US successfully lobbied to reduce the UN peacekeeping budget by $600*-*million, although they aimed for an initial $1*-*billion reduction. Although the resolution will be maintained, the case-by-case basis on which authorisation must be supported might present a significant challenge for Africa. UNSC discussions on implementation of 2719 in Somalia, for example, attract a strong negative US pushback. Whether Trump maintains America’s renewed focus on Africa will depend on aligning US and African interests – despite their diversity – and Washington’s push to counter Russia and China’s growing influence. Regardless of the US’s policy trajectory, Africa must be prepared. **DM** *Emmaculate Liaga, researcher, and Zenge Simakoloyi, research intern, ISS.* *First published by*[*ISS Today*](https://issafrica.org/iss-today).