A commuter walks past a minibus taxi riddled with bullet holes. (Photo: Gallo Images / The Times / Kevin Sutherland) 
How did we get here?
In 1987 deregulation hit the taxi industry. A decade earlier, the 1977 Van Breda commission of inquiry into the Road Transportation Bill decided South Africa had reached “a stage of economic and industrial development which enabled it to move towards a freer competition in transportation”.
Before that, the 1930 Motor Carrier Transportation Act required permits through the Local Road Transportation Board. Apartheid, and particularly the dompas influx control system, meant virtually no black operators qualified for these permits.
“The system meant that over 90% of taxi permit applications by blacks were rejected. Under such circumstances, most black taxi operators operated illegally using private saloon vehicles as taxis,” wrote Makubetse Sekhonyane and Jackie Dugard in the December 2004 SA Crime Quarterly.
A White Paper, alongside the 1988 Transport Deregulation Act, effectively introduced the 16-seaters that today remain the mainstay of the taxi industry.
The Cape taxi industry
As far back as the 1940s, sedan taxis provided transport on the Cape peninsula, filling in the gaps left by bus and train services. Its lucrative routes were divvied up around Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga, known as the Lagunya Taxi Association, and around Khayelitsha, where the Western Cape Black Taxi Association (Webta) was central.
When deregulation in the late 1980s opened the space for minibus taxi services, it also triggered competition over routes and income. Often dubbed the first Cape Peninsula taxi war, the conflict between Lagunya and Webta only ended in March 1992, when, under pressure from mediators and civil society — and in the spirit of the time, as negotiations for South Africa’s democratic transition kicked off — a united taxi organisation was founded: the Congress of Democratic Taxi Associations (Codeta).
The 2005 inquiry into taxi violence by advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza sets out how the first Codeta executive consisted of 16 members representing both Lagunya and Webta, but allegations of corruption and money misappropriation some two years later led to a breakaway, despite efforts to mediate.
The Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (Cata), made up predominantly of ex-Webta members, was established in October 1994.
“The rivalry between Cata and Codeta grew and resulted in many violent clashes that led to the 1996 Agreement (made an order of the High Court). The 1996 Agreement separated the two organisations into two different geographical areas. Codeta was allocated Khayelitsha and most of the areas to the north of R300, whilst Cata was given access to the areas south of R300.
“The allocation of areas was not based on anything except the preference for areas. This meant, in most instances, that associations that were on the wrong side of the boundary, were forced to join the federal structure that was near to them,” according to the August 2005 report of the Ntsebeza Committee of Inquiry into the Underlying Causes of Instability and Conflict in the Minibus Taxi Industry in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area.
“As a result, Cata members do not freely go to Khayelitsha and Codeta members do not freely go to Nyanga.”
And while Cata, Codeta and six other so-called regions, including the Mitchells Plain Taxi Association, joined up in a provincial taxi council that, in line with national developments, ultimately emerged as part of the South African National Taxi Council (Santaco) that was launched in September 2001.
Tensions in the Western Cape over exactly how the provincial council should be run ended up in court in 2017. The claimed right as a so-called mother body to organise outside regions remains a bone of contention, and factor, in taxi conflict.
A very rough timeline of Cape taxi conflicts
Taxi violence flares up periodically. In 1998, again in 2000/1 and in 2005, with more recent conflicts in 2018, 2020 and again, now. Bellville taxi rank features prominently as far back as the 1996 abolition of radius permits that allowed taxis to operate within 100kms of their home base area.
The reasons are multi-dimensional and steeped in money, corruption, and authorities’ don’t-care attitudes, alongside regulatory and planning failures.
For example, the 2000/1 taxi violence is directly linked to conflict over routes between the government-subsidised Golden Arrow bus services and a Codeta-Cata group known as the Ten-Ten, according to the inquiry committee report. Among the trigger factors were competition for commuters and grievances that taxi operators were still not considered for subsidies.
In March and April 2005, Codeta and Cata clashed over routes to the newly opened Capegate shopping mall that, according to news reports at the time, left six taxi operators dead and scores of commuters injured.
More recently, at least 13 people were killed in the May 2018 taxi conflict over routes from Delft, in northern Cape Town, while the Bellville taxi rank, one of Cape Town’s busiest hubs, has been repeatedly targeted, as happened in August 2020 when at least two people were killed.
What are the reasons for taxi conflicts?
Some are historical rivalries as set out above, and some of it is financial. Running taxis can bring in significant amounts of money — not for a driver, but definitely for an owner and the association. The 2005 inquiry was told of joining fees of between R10,000 to R60,000 — and, importantly, daily rank fees per vehicle, per route. Fifteen years ago, one case study at Bellville taxi rank showed one taxi association could make R600,000 in a week. In 2021, that would be R1.4-million.
Other reasons relate to organised crime and money laundering. In the Cape, the role of gangs looking to launder, for example, drug and abalone smuggling proceeds, cannot be ignored. Nationally, the inter-connection of taxi associations and hitmen, or iimbovane (ants) in the Cape, cannot be ignored. The 2017 Glebelands Hostel inquiry firmly established the link between hitmen, the hostel and the taxi industry in eThekwini and surrounds.
But much of the conflict is triggered by authorities’ flailing regulatory resolve, and seeming preference for short-term security crackdowns. The Western Cape transport budget for programme five: transport regulation is instructive — R71.6-million was spent on operating licences and permits; colloquially that’s taxi permits, but law enforcement got R365-million, according to the 2019/20 annual report.
Recapitalisation for regularisation
That taxi deregulation in the closing days of apartheid triggered a range of unforeseen consequences should not surprise anyone. An established body of academic and current affairs research indicates the role of apartheid security forces in fomenting conflict, even if by not acting to stop violence.
Soon after South Africa’s democratic transition in April 1994, the government looked toward re-regulating, at least to some extent. In April 1995, then transport minister Mac Maharaj established the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) that held a series of public hearings before completing its work on the reregulation of the taxi industry, and disbanding in July 1998.
A key gripe from the side of the taxis was the lack of subsidies, which were given to the buses and trains, for an industry that effectively transports 65% of South Africa’s commuters. The government’s concern was around criminal elements in the industry, and lack of compliance with laws, including commuter safety.
While some regulatory measures like the abolition of radius permits kicked off, others didn’t. Nationally, the taxi industry decided to establish Santaco to represent its interest vis-à-vis the government.
By 1999, a taxi recapitalisation programme was announced. It’s complex and wide-ranging, but the bottom line is that by regularising the taxi industry, the door was opened to anyone with interests in producing up to 35-seater kombis with safety features like roll bars and no jockey seats. Central has been the fee for old vehicle scrapping.
Dubbed recap, the Cabinet extended this programme in July 2005, and again and again. Most recently, in his May 2021 Budget vote speech, transport minister Fikile Mbalula announced a revised taxi recapitalisation programme as “key to our efforts to transform the face of our public transport and ensure that the taxi industry occupies its rightful place in the system”.
Aside from talking of “a new subsidy regime that recognises the role of the taxi industry as the preferred mode of choice for the majority of public transport users” — resolving tensions over leadership and unity would be a precondition — Mbalula also announced the embedding of the taxi industry with a 60% stake in a vehicle scrapping company.
The government’s commitment was to scrap 63,000 taxis by 2024, according to Mbalula.
At R50,000 a vehicle, that’s not a bad deal. R3.1-billion, or roughly a third of the national taxi industry estimated to be worth R10-billion.
The legislative front
The 2009 National Land Transportation Act gives significant regulatory powers to provincial governments and municipalities.
A provincial regulatory entity, or its municipal counterpart, may investigate any matter related to land transport — and make recommendations to the MEC or the council. If it all goes pear-shaped, the MEC may close down routes to try to calm conflicts.
Crucially, a provincial regulatory entity approves taxi operating licences with due consideration for an applicant’s traffic offences or convictions of crimes like possession of unlicensed firearms or explosives. Yes, the Act does talk of explosives.
The regulatory entity must monitor and oversee these operating licences with the input of provincial and municipal authorities who are responsible for effective planning, including how many operating licences can be allocated to a particular route.
A transport MEC, like a municipality, must plan, coordinate and supervise public transport in their respective areas and include SAPS and other law/traffic enforcement.
In the Western Cape, the DA government has passed its own transport legislation that, among others, established what’s known as the Taxi Regulator. But ultimately provincial authorities must work with the national government in terms of the constitutional imperative of cooperative governance.
Put differently, a key factor in any taxi conflict is the failure of provincial and municipal authorities to plan integrated public transport — beyond ranks and offering taxi associations interests in bus rapid transport companies — and to fully regulate operator licences in line with changing commuter needs.
It’s complicated. DM