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Analysis: ANC policy, radical economic transformation and ideological proxy battles for control

Analysis: ANC policy, radical economic transformation and ideological proxy battles for control

The ANC policy conference gets under way on Friday against a background of factionalism, dissatisfaction over President Jacob Zuma in many circles, and vocal support in others, amid #GuptaLeaks and a tough economic environment that is shedding jobs. Many of the policy discussion documents include self-reflexive analysis of the current situation. It’s just on the solutions and implementation that there’s fudginess and inertia, highlighted throughout documents with repeated references to yet-to-be-implemented resolutions taken as far back as the 2007 Polokwane national conference. And so it’s not really about policy, but ideology, with the radical economic transformation narrative as the proxy battle within the ANC. By MARIANNE MERTEN.

Five thousand delegates from Cabinet ministers, who are paying a premium R5,000 for attendance, down to ordinary party members representing their branches. Everyone has the right to speak on the topic for discussion, but not to be abusive. “Delegates must refrain from any behaviour or action which would bring the ANC or conference into disrepute. This includes singing derogatory songs against a comrade, leader, our alliance partners or guests,” says the ANC policy conference code of conduct. “No one should distribute, wear or display any material that is deemed to be divisive.”

It’s a sign of the times this has again made it into an ANC conference code of conduct.

And, if indications are anything to go by, unity by any means will, again, be a driving motivation. Several provinces, including the largest in the ANC, KwaZulu-Natal, and Gauteng, among the smaller ones, but powerful because it represents the economic heartland of South Africa, are coalescing around proposals to extend the number of top officials from the current six to a larger number. Eight has been mentioned, so has nine, amid speculation both ANC leadership slates of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and ANC Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa are to be included.

The argument runs like this: more permanent officials are needed at the Luthuli House head offices to ensure the ANC runs itself properly, and if both of the currently dominant leadership slates are represented that could only be a good thing. Because that meant there would be unity. City Press and Sunday Times have reported on a series of pre-conference meetings towards agreement ahead of policy conference discussions.

But such an enforced joining of groupings and fiddling with the number hasn’t really worked in the past. In the aftermath of 2007 Polokwane national conference, which saw Zuma elected party president, the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) was increased from 60 to 86, to overcome criticism that there were too many Cabinet ministers to represent other constituencies. Or as the Mail & Guardian reported at the time: “In its organisational renewal report, the ANC said increasing the size of the NEC would ensure that there were more members to meet the demands arising from provincial and sectoral deployment; ensure an appropriate gender balance and generational mix; and ensure that the NEC represents a broad spectrum of the motive forces and has members from different centres of power.”

A quick look at the current NEC still reflects a majority of its members come from the Executive, compared to those members representing ANC alliance partners the South African Communist Party (SACP) and labour federation Cosatu – or even long-standing ANC members not in government or in alliance structures.

What happens to be proposed regarding the ANC structures at this policy conference – up for resolution at the national conferences, the highest binding decision making structure – is important. And so the policy conference sets aside two days for “strategy and tactics and organisational renewal”.

These discussions come as the ANC declined a consultative conference on the state of the ANC that many of its stalwarts and veterans have called for in the wake of deep misgivings over Zuma’s leadership and its impact. There would be two days of discussions at the policy conference, but no separate consultative conference the ANC decided. Such a consultative conference spearheaded by veterans is planned for later this year, but veterans may well attend the policy conference in their individual capacities.

It remains to be seen what answers the organisational renewal discussions will offer to a rather tough assessment in the organisational renewal policy discussion document:  “The ANC faces declining fortunes. Internal squabbles, money politics, corruption and poor performance in government all conspire to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public. Some progressive formations and individuals who historically have been part of the broad front of forces for change are challenging the movement on important current issues, particularly corruption.”

But back to policy, and the discourse on radical economic transformation.

The 2012 Mangaung ANC conference resolved to radically transform the economy as part of the second phase of the transition. However, there seemed to be little movement until the ANC lekgotla earlier this year, and the 2017 State of the Nation Address (SONA), when Zuma announced “radical socio-economic transformation” as a central focus. He quoted the ANC lekgota definition of radical socio-economic transformation word for word in his address in Parliament: “Fundamental change in the structure, systems, institutions and patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female…”

This turn to radical economic transformation came amid escalating tensions among various groupings within the ANC, in the wake of a 2106 municipal poll that saw ANC support drop nationally from 65% to 54% and continuing woes in a low-growth economy.

Within this radical economic transformation rhetoric, its link to the return of the land through expropriation without compensation is one area that starkly illustrates the disjunct of ANC party policy-making and ANC government policy implementation.

For 10 years the ANC government has endeavoured to put a new expropriation law into place. Today, there is none.

The 2007 ANC Polokwane conference called for “strong interventions in the private land marked combined with better use of state land”, and resolved: “All legislation pertaining to expropriation must be aligned with the Constitution.” Echoing this, the 2012 Mangaung ANC conference resolved to “replace the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ with the “just and equitable” principle in the Constitution immediately where the state is acquiring land for land reform purposes” and for “expropriation without compensation on land acquired through unlawful means or used for illegal purposes having due regard to Section 25 of the Constitution”.

The first legislative draft in 2008 was withdrawn after concerns that the lack of recourse to courts was unconstitutional. Seven years later a revised bill landed in Parliament which adopted it in May 2016. But in February 2017 President Jacob Zuma, concerned about the public consultation process, returned it to the national legislature.

It is against this background that the rhetoric of radical economic transformation must be scrutinised, and contextualised in the factional battles.

This is of course not to say that there are not deep-seated fundamental inequalities in the way South Africa’s economy is structured, and remains structured, even after more than 15 years of black economic empowerment and employment equity imperatives. Perhaps it is for this reason Mineral Resources Minister Mosebenzi Zwane upped the BEE quota to 30%, in line with ANC policy discussion document proposals, in the recently published Mining Charter. That charter is now being challenged in court.

The ANC organisational renewal document tackles the ideological contests around radical economic transformation, and its relation to the broader issues of South Africa’s democracy, which several of the party’s leaders, including Ramaphosa, argued must be more than slogans.

“The campaign for ‘radical’ economic transformation entails more than the narrow self-interest of this group to amass more wealth. It should encompass efforts to change the structure of the economy to advance manufacturing and beneficiation, investment of more resources in productive activities, and comprehensive broad-based economic empowerment,” the document states. “It therefore behoves the black capitalist group to appreciate that their own narrow advancement in a manner that deepens social inequality will yield the same bitter fruit of social conflict.

That correlation between race, class (or motive forces in ANC lingo) and political allegiance remains a conundrum for the governing party, which as self-professed leader of society, is keenly aware many of its policies have actively supported the growth of the black middle class, even if still minute and precariously at the edge of middle classdom in these troubled economic times.

The 2016 local government elections, which saw the ANC lose politically and strategically important Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay metros, have heralded a shift in electoral allegiances, according to the organisational renewal document. “This is a consequence mainly of subjective weaknesses within the ANC… In some instances, their electoral choices, however misplaced, reflect a sense of impatience and urgency. In other words, some among the motive forces contend that continuing social transformation does not necessarily require ANC leadership as such.”

It’s a blunt assessment. But the question for delegates at the ANC policy conference is what to do about it. Zuma’s opening political address on Friday will contribute to setting the tone.

The outcomes of the policy conference will highlight which way the wind blows in the ANC. With its December national elective conference just over five months away, the temperature in the ideological proxy battle for control of the party is set to rise. DM

Photo: South Africa’s ruling African national Congress (ANC) holds its national general council in Durban in 2010. Photo: JON HRUSA/EPA

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